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FRAGILE GAINS: TWO CENTURIES OF
CANADIAN AND UNITED STATES POLICY
TOWARD INDIANS
Ralph W. Johnson*
AbstracL The United States and Canada share a common history in their policies
toward and legal treatment of the Native Americans that historically have occupied both
countries. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 established a policy of recognizing Aboriginal
title and treating with Indians that was binding on the colonies that preceded both coun-
tries, and influenced both governments in later dealings with tribes. Assimilationist
themes are evident as well in the national policy toward Indians in both countries. Never-
theless, historically and in the present, national policies and laws of the two governments
can be contrasted. This Article sets forth a detailed comparison of the historical events
surrounding white settlement and displacement of Indians from their Aboriginal lands. It
further describes trends in the creation and development of Indian law, in the United
States Congress and the Canadian Parliament,-and in the courts of both countries. United
States Supreme Court Justice John Marshall first recognized tribal sovereignty in develop-
ing a federal common law that has been extremely influential in the Indian jurisprudence
of both countries. Presently in the United States, however, the Supreme Court is hostile
toward tribal sovereignty and will not review federal legislative actions toward tribes,
while Congress is an increasing champion of tribal self-government and economic self-
development. Conversely, the Canadian Parliament continues in its assinfilationist legisla-
tive attitudes, refusing to recognize inherent powers of sovereignty in tribal government.
Nevertheless, aboriginal rights of the Indigenous peoples of Canada were codified in the
1982 Constitution, and the Canadian Supreme Court has recently taken unto itself the
power to scrutinize legislative action in light of those rights.
INTRODUCTION .......................................... 645
I. THE HISTORICAL SETTING ....................... 646
A. Aboriginal Claims ................................ 646
B. National Policies v. Implementation ............... 647
C. Knowledge of Indian History ..................... 648
II. HISTORICAL POLICY TOWARDS INDIANS ....... 654
A. The United States: A Historical Perspective ....... 654
1. Treaties as Land Transactions ................. 656
2. Treaties Construed In Favor of Indians ........ 656
• Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law.' The author wishes to
acknowledge receipt of a summer research grant from the University of Washington School of
Law, which aided in the writing of this Article. The author thanks Richard H. Bartlett,
Professor of Law, University of Saskatchewan and Chair of Natural Resources Law, University
of Calgary, and Sasha Harmon, doctoral candidate, University of Washington Department of
History, for their insightful review and comments on earlier drafts of this Article. The author
also thanks law students Craighton Goeppele and Rachael Paschal for their research assistance.
All views expressed herein, however, are those of the author.
Washington Law Review
3. The 1887 Allotment Act: Assimilation
Accelerated ................................... 658
4. The 1934 Indian Reorganization Act and Self-
Determination ................................ 661
5. The Termination Policy: Public Law 280 ....... 662
6. Self-Determination Adopted as National Policy
.............................................. 663
7. Whittling Sovereignty Away: The Supreme
Court's Recent Trend ......................... 664
a. Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction ......... 664
b. Tribal Court Civil Jurisdiction: Preemption
A nalysis ................................... 665
B. Canada ........................................... 666
1. Assimilation Policy Formally Adopted ......... 668
2. Treaty Interpretation in Canada ............... 670
3. Subjugation Under the Indian Act ............. 673
4. Termination in Canada: A Short-Lived "Era".. 674
5. Canada Begins To Recognize Aboriginal Rights
.............................................. 675
6. Academics and Lawyers Take Up the Indian
Cause ........................................ 675
III. ABORIGINAL RIGHTS ............................. 678
A. The United States ................................ 678
B. Canada ........................................... 680
1. Canadian Hostility Toward Aboriginal Rights.. 680
2. Recent Canadian Recognition of Aboriginal
R ights ........................................ 682
3. Sparrow v. The Queen Requires Judicial Review
of Laws ....................................... 683
IV. FEDERAL POWERS REGARDING NATIVE
AMERICANS AND NATIVE CANADIANS ........ 684
A. The United States ................................ 684
1. The Plenary Power of Congress over Indians
and the Indian Commerce Clause .............. 684
2. All Indian Treaties Have Been at Least Partially
A brogated .................................... 685
3. The Trust Relationship in the United States .... 686
B. Canada ........................................... 687
1. The Indian Act Stifles Tribal Governments .... 688
2. The Trust Relationship in Canada ............. 689
Vol. 66:643, 1991
Indian Policies of the U.S. and Canada
3. Does the Sparrow Concept Fit the United
States? ........................................ 692
V. STATE AND PROVINCIAL POWER OVER
INDIANS ............................................ 695
A. United States ..................................... 695
B. Canada ........................................... 698
VI. INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT ..................... 700
A. The United States ................................ 700
1. Federal Delegation of Environmental Control to
Indian Tribes ................................. 704
2. The Power To Exclude ........................ 706
3. Tribal Legislatures and Tribal Courts .......... 707
B. Canada ........................................... 708
1. Federal Delegation of Environmental Control to
First Nations ................................. 712
2. Tribal Courts ................................. 712
VII. CONCLUSION ....................................... 712
INTRODUCTION
Native Americans1 of Canada and the United States have struggled
for more than 200 years, largely beneath the surface of mainstream
history, to retain their cultural identity, to keep or recapture Aborigi-
nal lands, and increasingly to protect their rights to self-determination
and self-government.
1. In the United States the term "Indian" is normally used to describe aboriginal Americans.
The term "tribe" (alternatively "nation") is used to describe both ethnological groups of Native
Americans as well as the contemporary legal-political groups (often comprised of several
ethnological tribes) that occupy and govern modem-day reservations. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 3, 19 (1982). An exception is Alaska where aboriginals are usually
referred to as "Alaska Natives," and the legal-political groups of Natives are usually identified as
"Villages," although at times the terms "tribes" and "bands" are still used. D. CASE, ALASKA
NATIvEs AND AMERICAN LAWS 10 (1984).
In Canada the term "Indian" is sometimes used to describe all Aboriginals, but not the Metis.
The preferred terms now are "First Nation," Indigenous People, or Aboriginal. In the literature
the term "band" is often used in Canada rather than "tribe." . WOODWARD, NATIVE LAW
2-14 (1990). The above definitions are the most widely used in the literature and legislation,
however the definition of these terms often depends on the legislative intent of Congress or
Parliament. The precise meaning must be determined by context, and requires a particularized
analysis.
Douglas Sanders has said that if there is a legal definition of the word "Metis," it must mean
the people who took "half-breed" grants under the Manitoba Act of 1870 or the Dominion
Lands Act, or the descendants of those people. Sanders, Aboriginal Peoples and the Constitution,




This is a comparative study of United States and Canadian policies
and laws towards Native Americans. Both Canada and the United
States share the same "mother country." Both are federations, with
populations that share similar racial problems and social systems; both
share the common law system; and, both share similar moral, ethical,
and political values. Differences in the two nations' Indian policies are
partly based on demographics. More often, however, they reflect con-
scious choices about dealing with the "Indian problem." This Article
analyzes these choices and their impacts on the lives of Native Ameri-
cans and non-Native Americans. The Article evaluates both success-
ful and unsuccessful policies of the two countries. It is my hope that
these comparisons will afford improved understanding and awareness
of this complex subject and will contribute constructively towards the
continuing debate about the enlightened and successful national poli-
cies that should be adopted towards Indians.
I. THE HISTORICAL SETTING
A. Aboriginal Claims
Historically, the conqueror governments of Canada and the United
States have exhibited persistent, negative attitudes towards Indians
and their aboriginal claims. For example, in 1855, Congress enacted a
law allowing contract suits to be brought against the United States in
the newly created Court of Claims.2 When it became apparent that
Indian tribes might file suit under this Act for treaty violations, Con-
gress, in 1863, amended the Act specifically to deny Indians access to
the new court.' Thereafter, an Indian tribe had to obtain a special Act
of Congress to bring suit for treaty violations. It was not until after
the 1946 Indian Claims Act that the United States paid most claims,
and then only partially.4 In 1955, the United States Supreme Court
held that the taking of aboriginal title by the United States did not give
rise to an Indian claim for fifth amendment' compensation. 6 In fact,
until the 1930s, even the taking of title "recognized" by treaty, agree-
2. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612 (currently codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 171 (1988)).
3. The 1863 statute was allegedly enacted to punish Indians for the hostilities of some tribes
against the United States. See H.R. REP. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945).
4. The Indian Claims Commission awarded judgments for the value of the land when it was
taken by the United States in the 1800s, and refused to award interest on those sums for the years
up to the date of the Commission award. The normal rule is that interest is awarded for fifth
amendment takings. UNITED STATES INDIAN CLAIMS COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 11 (1978).
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
6. Tee-Hit-Ton v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
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ment, or statute, by the federal government was not clearly
compensable.7
Canada likewise refused to give credence to First Nation Aboriginal
claims. From 1927 through the early 1930s, it was a crime to assist a
First Nation in Canada to fie suit against the government based on
Aboriginal title.' In 1969, a government white paper recommended
that all Aboriginal claims be ignored and forgotten.' It was not until
the 1973 case of Calder v. Attorney-General, 10 the Constitution Act of
1982,11 and the 1990 decision in Sparrow v. The Queen,12 that the
Canadian government began recognizing Aboriginal rights.
B. National Policies v. Implementation
Early national laws and policies were sometimes directly damaging
to Native American tribes. More often, however, it was the imple-
mentation of laws, 13 or the lack thereof, that needlessly damaged or
destroyed Indigenous peoples' culture, religion, health, and self-
esteem.14 Time and again, the lofty statements and high policies of the
two national governments were ignored or consciously thwarted: first,
by avaricious prospectors and settlers who embraced Manifest Destiny
as an excuse to take Indian land and resources, legally or otherwise;
and second, by local politicians and land developers. The dominant
society's belief in its own moral, cultural, and religious superiority was
based on western conceptions of civilization, on attitudes of racial
superiority, and on an often religious, ethnocentric view of life that
denied validity to Native American cultures, religions, and lifestyles.
The historical literature about Indian/White relations is replete with
7. See United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591 (1873); see also Pine River Logging &
Improvement Co. v. United States, 186 U.S. 279 (1902); 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 710 (1890); 19 Op.
Att'y Gen. 194 (1888).
8. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
9. STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA ON INDIAN POLICY (1969).
10. Calder v. Attorney-General, 1973 S.C.R. 313, aff'g 13 D.L.R.3d 64, 74 W.W.R. 481
(B.C. 1970).
11. Constitution Act, 1982, CAN. REV. STAT. app. II, No. 44 (1985).
12. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
13. See, eg., United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 641-42 (1978):
The account of the federal attempts to satisfy the obligations of the United States both to
those [Choctaws] who remained [in Mississippi] and to those who removed, is one best left
to historians. It is enough to say here that the failure of these attempts, characterized by
incompetence, if not corruption, proved an embarrassment and an intractable problem for
the Federal Government for at least a century.
14. Some historians have chronicled the numerous disasters that occurred to Indians in the
implementation of national Indian policies. See A. DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE
UNITED STATES (1970); B. DIPPLE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN (1982); W. HAGAN,
AMERICAN INDIANS (rev. ed. 1979);. F. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER (abr. ed. 1986).
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examples of this attitude.15 A typical problem for United States tribes
was that when they would move to their assigned reservation they
would find it already occupied by white settlers. The response of the
national government was not to call out the troops and expel the white
trespassers, but to coerce and cajole the Indians into ceding more land
or moving to some other, usually less desirable, area. 16 At other times,
tribes who had been assigned and were already living on a reservation
would discover settlers infiltrating, taking gold, water, and timber, and
settling on reservation lands. t7 Seldom did the United States require
settlers to move. It was the Indians who had to move, adjust, and
absorb the loss.
The history of treaty implementation"8 is, unfortunately, not within
the scope of this Article. But that history should be kept in mind as
background against which to measure the choice and the impact of
laws and policies.
C. Knowledge of Indian History
One of the sad truths about policies towards Indians is the fact that
the public, as well as most political leaders, historians, and lawyers,
have had very little knowledge of or interest in Indian history. For
most of this century, school children have learned how the West was
15. See generally A. DEBO, supra note 14; FELIX COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW (1942); F. PRUCHA, supra note 14; see also R. BERKHOFER, JR., THE WHrrE MAN'S
INDIAN (1978); D. BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1970); V. DELORIA, JR.,
CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS (1969); B. DIPPLE, supra note 14.
16. The history of the Puyallup Indian Tribe in Washington state, which recently negotiated
a multi-million dollar land claims settlement, provides a good example of this problem. See
Draft White Paper-Puyallup Indians Negotiations Project (on file with the Washington Law
Review); see also Puyallup Tribe of Indians v. Port of Tacoma, 525 F. Supp. 65, 71-74 (W.D.
Wash. 1981), aff'd, 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
17. See, e.g., F. PRUCHA, supra note 14, at 211-16; Report of Henry Knox on White Outrages
(Secretary of War to the Continental Congress) (July 18, 1788), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 11 (F. Prucha 2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS]; see also
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 377-79 (1980) (describing events
surrounding the dismantling of the great Sioux reserve).
18. The United States Congress banned further treaty signing with Indian tribes in 1871.
Some 389 treaties were negotiated between the United States and various Indian tribes. Treaty
making, however, has not been as dominant as often thought. "Of the 52 million acres of trust
land now held by the tribes and individual Indians, only about 20 million were originally
recognized by treaty." C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 8 (1987). Of
the balance, 23 million acres were set aside by executive orders between 1855 and 1919, and the
rest were established by agreements, which were approved by Congress, or by federal statute.
Treaties and agreements covered nearly 95% of the United States public domain. U.S. INDIAN
CLAIMS COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 1 (1978). After that date reservations were created by statute,
congressionally approved agreement, or executive order. In Canada, treaties were still being
signed after World War II, and treaties cover nearly half of the nation. NATIVE RIGHTS IN
CANADA 13, 53 (P. Cumming & N. Mickenberg 2d ed. 1972).
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"won" by pioneers, cowboys, gold seekers, and railroad builders.
Indians play a minor role, being "bad" and impeding white "pro-
gress," or, in some cases, being "good" and cooperating with whites.19
Rarely taught are historical events such as the Yakima War, fought
for four long years, from 1855 to 1859, in which the vigilante Oregon
"Volunteers," independent of the United States Army, committed
atrocities against Indian men, women, and children.20 Eventually, of
course, the industrialized, "civilized" society won. The war was a mil-
itary, political, and economic disaster for the Indians.
This was a monumentally important event in the lives of the
Yakima, Nez Perce, Walla, Cayuse, and Umatilla tribes. Similar cata-
clysmic events occurred with other Indian tribes throughout both
nations, yet the dominant society treats these events as curiosities
rather than significant historical events. This lack of understanding
continues to contribute to legislative myopia in policymaking and
unfair interpretations of statutes and treaties by courts and
administrators.
The study of Native American history teaches that the overriding,
but rarely articulated, policy of Canada and the United States towards
Aboriginals was to get them out of the way so their land could be
settled and developed by whites.2 The second most pervasive policy,
governmental action taken "for the good of the Indians," effectively
abolished Indian religion, culture, and lifestyle. These policies were
sometimes motivated by altruism, to the extent that they were
designed to do as little harm as possible to the Indians while achieving
the overriding goal of eliminating Aboriginal occupancy, religion, and
culture. In spite of high-toned rhetoric about tribes and First Nations
freely signing treaties, the land acquisition policy was only occasion-
ally accomplished by fair, arms-length transactions. Most of the time
the government acquired lands by a combination of coercion, fraud,
threat of force, or actual military force. While the earliest acquisitions
by the British Crown along the eastern seaboard were made by
purchase,22 later ones were produced by coercion. It is absurd to
argue that Aboriginal tribes knowingly and voluntarily gave up their
claims to these lands. If the westward-bound settlers in either Canada
or the United States had asked the indigenous occupants whether they
19. P. LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST 219-21 (1987). Older "westerns" are
repeatedly replayed on television, with their stereotyped savage Indians on display.
20. W. BROWN, THE INDIAN SIDE OF THE STORY (1961).
21. See S. CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE-AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICAL
RESURGENCE (1988).
22. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 545 (1832).
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would prefer (1) to be removed from ancient homelands, hunting, fish-
ing, and food gathering grounds, forced often to live on distant,
strange, hostile lands,2 3 be squeezed onto tiny reservations with other
often incompatible tribes, made totally dependent on the white man
for the most meager of rations,24 even survival, and have their cul-
tures, customs, and religions ridiculed, prohibited, and debased, or (2)
remain on their ancestral lands, continue their traditional lifestyles, be
treated with dignity and respect, and choose their own time, place, and
method for adopting or rejecting industrialization and technological
advances, does anyone doubt the answer?
Manifest Destiny, the Oregon Trail, and Westward Ho were not
rallying cries for square-dealing with Aboriginal tribes. These con-
cepts gave mythical and moral support to westward-bound settlers in
both Canada and the United States, the Indigenous peoples be
damned. These powerful ideas were based on the profoundly held
faith that the West, in both countries, was there to be won by white
men. The Aboriginals were savage heathens, obstacles to progress, to
be battled if necessary and overcome, like wild animals, the weather,
and the desert. It was inconceivable to whites that these natives had
any "right" to stop the westward march of Christian civilization, car-
ried by prospectors, farmers, and settlers.
In the late 1880s, the western United States had been largely "set-
tled," boundaries had been set between Canada, the United States, and
Mexico, and the Aboriginal peoples subdued and required to live on
reservations. Most of the reservations to be created were in place by
then. By 1887, the plight of the Native population was so bad it both-
ered the conscience of the white society and government. Something
had to be done. That something proved to be the Dawes Act of
1887,25 yet another disaster for Indigenous people.
23. After the early 1800s, when the British-Canadian and United States governments attained
dominance over the less-developed native groups, many tribes in the United States were removed
from their homelands and forced to live in distant places, thus opening their traditional lands to
settlement by pioneers. Multiple tribes were often consolidated on a single confederated
reservation, including tribes with diverse cultures and sometimes backgrounds of outright
hostility towards each other. Traditional cultures, religions, and self-governance systems
foundered. The Indians became the poorest and smallest minority in both Canada and the
United States, conditions which prevail today. A. DEBO, supra note 14, at 117; F. PRUCHA,
supra note 14, at 64, 78.
24. Historian Hagan concludes: "That starvation and near-starvation conditions were present
on some of the sixty-odd reservations every year for the quarter century after the Civil War is
manifest." Hagan, The Reservation Policy: Too Little and Too Late, in INDIAN-WHITE
RELATIONS: A PERSISTENT PARADOX 161 (1976).
25. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988)).
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Congress intended, through the Dawes Act, to break up reserva-
tions and make landowners of the Indians. At the same time, a new
government policy was initiated declaring as surplus reservation land
that was not parcelled out as allotments to individual Indians and
arbitrarily opening that land to white settlement. Although Congress
eventually stopped the allotment and surplus land practices, by 1934
these programs had transferred two-thirds of reservation lands from
Indian to white ownership. Land ownership has remained in this pat-
tern to the present self-determination era.
In Canada, Parliament never enacted a Dawes type of legislation.
Frequently, however, land-hungry settlers pushed aside First Nations,
which lost their Aboriginal lands without benefit of negotiations, ces-
sion, or reservation. Both countries have consistently promoted eth-
nocentric assimilation policies, overlooking or - ignoring Native
American traditions, lifestyles, religions, and cultures. Quite remarka-
bly, instead of being assimilated and disappearing, Indigenous people
have demonstrated surprising resilience and today are moving to reaf-
firm their history, religion, and cultural identity.
One contributing factor in this self-determination movement has
been the accessibility of better legal talent for Indian tribes. For exam-
ple, the University of New Mexico Indian Center student program has
encouraged several hundred Indian lawyers to enter the law, and most
of them now represent Indians and Indian tribes. The civil rights
movement and especially the introduction of young lawyers to the
field of Indian law through the Office of Economic Opportunity Pro-
gram enhanced the competence of tribal representation. The creation
of the Native American Rights Fund in 1968 markedly improved the
competence of lawyering for Indian tribes. This enhanced legal repre-
sentation has facilitated negotiation of Indian claims.
Historically, states, provinces, and local governments26 ignored
Indian claims of treaty, statutory, or other rights until tribes com-
menced litigation and secured court decisions affirming their legally
enforceable rights. Typically, successful tribal lawsuits have con-
vinced state or local governments to negotiate rather than litigate.
This scenario plays out again and again. Officials of the State of Maine
ignored the claim of the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot Indians to
most of the state until court decisions put both respect and fear into
26. In United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), the Court remarked: "Because of the
local ill feeling, the people of the States where they [Native Americans] are found are often their
deadliest enemies." I. at 384.
Washington Law Review Vol. 66:643, 1991
the hearts of these officials.27 Non-Indian water users ignored Indian
water rights claims until litigation was under way, or concluded with
an Indian victory.28 Washington also refused to recognize Indian
treaty fishing rights until the federal courts ruled that the tribes were
entitled to catch fifty percent of the harvestable fish under treaties of
the 1850s.29 The State of Washington refused to negotiate settlement
of the Puyallup Tribe's ownership claims to tidelands and a river bed
in the City of Tacoma until various suits were filed, and some brought
to conclusion.3°
In Canada, the national and provincial governments paid little
attention to First Nation Aboriginal land claims until the 1973 case of
Calder v. Attorney-General31 raised a realistic possibility that Aborigi-
nal rights might receive favorable consideration by the courts.
National policy toward Aboriginal claims changed from open hostility
in the 1930s, to recommending they be ignored in the late 1960s, to
recommending recognition and settlement of these claims after Calder.
27. In Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975),
the court held that the United States had a trust obligation to the Passamaquoddy tribe. This led
the United States to file suit against the State of Maine under the Trade and Intercourse Act of
1789. Even the filing of suit did not initially get the attention of Governor James Longley who
"refused to consider the Indian land claim a serious matter." P. Brodeur, Annals of Law:
Restitution, NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 1982, at 102. Ultimately, a Justice Department opinion
frightened state officials sufficiently that they engaged in serious negotiations and settled the
Indian's claims. Id. at 104-05.
28. This issue is highly divisive. Negotiation is especially difficult because the waters of many
streams are already fully allocated. Recognizing the Indian claim, even though legally prior in
time, will likely reduce the water available to lower priority non-Indians. Even an Indian victory
in court, however, does not necessarily produce "wet" water for the Indians. The cost of
construction and the impact on water and land areas off the reservation normally require that
Congress enact a law to implement the Indians' rights. Congress is loathe to do this if it will
deprive non-Indian irrigators of essential water. See McCool, Indian Water Rights" Negotiatiom
Agreement; Legislative Settlement, in INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND WATER RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT 127 (1989).
29. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658 (1979). Sports and commercial fishermen in the Pacific Northwest criticized the
Indians for years, in the 1950s and 196 0 s, about demonstrations and "fish-ins" in support of their
treaty rights. The Indians should use the court system like civilized people, the critics said. The
Indian tribes finally did go to court-a federal court, not an Indian court-and won the right to
harvest 50% of the fish under their treaties, instead of 3% which is the amount the state had
limited them to in the past. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974),
aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
After the Indian victory some non-Indians said the Indians were being greedy. But let us
assume that a non-Indian corporation was advised by its lawyers that if it filed suit against the
state on a property right issue it might win a judgment of hundreds of millions of dollars. Would
we expect the corporation to voluntarily forego filing such a suit? Hardly!
30. See Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
31. 1973 S.C.R. 313.
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Other historical factors condition contemporary negotiations with
Indian tribes. In Canada, the British North America Act of 1867 and
the Constitution Act of 1930 bestowed on the provinces ownership of
the natural resources within their borders, including rivers.32 The
provinces thus hold title to public lands not yet conveyed to private
owners. The Canadian national government owns relatively little land
in comparison to the United States federal government, which owns
approximately one-third of the United States, including half of the
land in the eleven western states, and ninety-five percent of Alaska.33
Provincial ownership of land enhances the power of the provinces in
negotiations with First Nations on Aboriginal claims concerning land,
water, hunting and fishing, environmental rights, and governmental
powers.
This Article examines several sharply defined differences in Indian
law and policy between Canada and the United States. United States
courts have held that Congress has "plenary" power over Indians,34
and that, under Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock35 judicial review is not avail-
able to test acts of Congress against the federal trust responsibility to
Indians. Canadian courts historically applied the same rules, 3 until
the Canadian Supreme Court held in Sparrow v. The Queen 31 that the
1982 Constitution Act requires judicial review to assure that legisla-
tion truly advances the interests of First Nations. The court detailed
the methodology for this review, which resembles remarkably the
"strict scrutiny" examination given to racially based legislation in the
United States.38 Canadian law is thus very different from current
32. British North America Act, 1867, CAN. REV. STAT. app. II, No. 5, ch. 3, §§ 92(10), (16)
(1985); Constitution Act, 1930, CAN. REv. STAT. app. II, No. 26, ch. 26 (1985).
33. See U.S. PUBLIC LAND LAW REviEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND, A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 22-23 (1970).
34. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375
(1886).
35. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
36. Aboriginal title "is subject to regulations imposed by validly enacted federal laws."
Kruger v. R., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104, 116 (1977) (citation omitted). Although the government now
holds a fiduciary relationship regarding Indians, that relationship is relatively recent. R. v.
Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1108 (citing Guerin v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335; R. v. Taylor &
Williams, 34 O.R.2d 360 (1981)).
Woodward concludes that "[i]n the United States Indian Tribes are considered to be...
subject to the full power of Congress to interfere with internal self-government by express
legislation (citation omitted). Although never clearly expressed as such by any court, the
situation in Canada is probably similar." . WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 90-91; see also R. v.
Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R., at 1103.
37. [1990] 1 S.C.K. 1075, 1108-09.
38. Few statutes survive strict scrutiny. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
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United States law with regard to Indians. Canadian courts review leg-
islation to assure consistency with the government's trust responsibil-
ity, whereas United States courts refuse to undertake such review.
In the United States, Indian tribes assert broad sovereign governing
powers over their reservations, including criminal jurisdiction over tri-
bal members and civil jurisdiction over non-member Indians and non-
Indians as well as tribal members. In Canada, the First Nations exer-
cise minimal self-governing powers, lacking sovereignty even over
their own members. The governing powers they do exercise are con-
trolled by exceedingly detailed federal laws, primarily the Indian Act.
The following pages are divided into five sections that help explain
the relationship of Native Americans to the national and state/provin-
cial governments, and the growing tribal insistence on self-govern-
ment. Each heading starts with a discussion of United States law and
policy, followed by a discussion on Canadian law and policy. Com-
parisons are generally made in the sections on Canadian law.
II. HISTORICAL POLICY TOWARDS INDIANS
A. The United States: A Historical Perspective
In the past this [federal/tribal] relationship has oscillated between
two equally harsh and unacceptable extremes. 39
Historically, United States national policy towards Indians' has
swung widely, urging assimilation into the dominant culture, or favor-
ing self-determination and tribal identity. In 1763, before the United
States became a separate nation, Great Britain issued a Royal Procla-
mation designed to separate the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal popu-
lations, and set aside an enormous land reserve for Aboriginals in what
is now western Canada and the western United States.41 The Procla-
mation provided that no part of the reserved land could be acquired by
purchase or otherwise unless by consent of the Crown. The United
States continued this policy of exclusive federal jurisdiction by enact-
ing the Trade and Intercourse Acts.42 The continuing policy of sepa-
39. H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970) (President Nixon's message to Congress
transmitting recommendations for Indian policy).
40. The Department of the Interior has "recognized" 306 Indian tribes in the lower 48 states
and 197 Native Villages in Alaska. 53 Fed. Reg. 52,829 (1988). Dozens of other Native groups
are seeking recognition. See infra notes 91-94. Still other reservations and their governments
have been disestablished.
41. Royal Proclamation of 1763, CAN. REV. STAT. app. II, No. 1 (1985). See R. SuRTEES,
CANADIAN INDIAN POLIcY 22 (1982).
42. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137. This first act and the next three, enacted in 1793,
1796, and 1799 were temporary. A permanent Act was enacted in 1802 and has been reenacted
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rating the Indians and non-Indians ultimately resulted in the removal
of many eastern tribes to the western United States.
From the nation's birth until about 1815, military defense dictated
national Indian policy. Treaties with the great Iroquois Confederacy
and other confederations and tribes gained allies for the new nation or
neutralized military threats. Some tribes retained enough power to
threaten the new nation's existence.43 Indian support or opposition
could affect battles, sometimes even wars. After approximately 1815,
this was no longer true.
Between 1815 and about 1845, the national government policy
favored removal, designed to clear Indians off the land and to reduce
conflict with non-Indians. 4 As early as 1803, President Thomas Jef-
ferson favored the idea of removal. He urged William Henry Harri-
son, governor of the Indiana Territory, to convince the Indians to
move voluntarily and, if they resisted remoyal and took up the
"hatchet" while trying to remain in their homeland, to seize their land
and drive them across the Mississippi.' President Monroe sent a
message to Congress in 1825, emphasizing the importance of removal,
saying that it should only be done "to promote the interest and happi-
ness of those tribes" and on terms "satisfactory" to them.4" Andrew
Jackson, who was President when the Cherokee removal occurred,47
advised the tribes to voluntarily move to the west or else submit to
several times since. It is now found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1160, 1165 (1988); 25 U.S.C. §§ 177,
179-80, 193-94, 201, 229-30, 251, 263, 264 (1988). See generally F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN
INDIAN POLICY IN THE FO MA'VE YEARS (1962).
43. See F. PiucHA, supra note 14, at 17.
44. For a detailed history of these eras see F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 78 (describing
"removal").
45. See Letter from President Jefferson to William Henry Harrison, governor of Indiana
Territory, (February 27, 1803), reprinted in DocuMENTS, supra note 17, at 22-23. Jefferson
urged Harrison to convince the Indians to move west of tie Mississippi, saying:
[W]e presume that our strength and their weakness is now so visible that they must see we
have only to shut our hand to crush them .... Should any tribe be foolhardy enough to
take up the hatchet at any time, the seizing the whole country of that tribe, and driving them
across the Mississippi, as the only condition of peace, would be an example to others ....
IA at 23.
46. DoCuMENTS, supra note 17, at 39. -
47. In 1830, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830), under
which numerous tribes were re-settled in the West.
The Five Civilized Tribes, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole were
removed from their ancestral homes in what is now Georgia and Florida to Oklahoma. Some
4,000 died on the winter journey to the west, out of 13,000 who started the trek. F. COHEN,
supra note 1, at 92. Numerous other tribes were also removed, including the Delav~ares,
Kickapoos, Quapaws, Shawnees, Kaskaskias, Peorias, Piankashaws, Weas, Winnebagoes,
Chippewas, and Ottawas. F. PRUCHA, supra note 14, at 78-83, 88-90.
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state laws because the Constitution did not provide for Indian tribal
governments.48 Secretary of War Eaton wrote to Cherokee leaders,
[b]eyond the Mississippi your prospects will be different. There you
will find no conflicting interests. The United States power and sover-
eignty, uncontrolled by the high authority of state jurisdiction, and rest-
ing on its own energies, will be able to say to you, in the language of
your own nation, the soil shall be yours while the trees grow, or the
streams run.
4 9
The removal policy was discarded during the 1840s and 1850s, not
because it fell into disfavor, but because Indian country was overrun
by gold and land-hungry prospectors and settlers.50 Violence between
Indians and whites often resulted. Whites wanted the land, but the
Indians had to be removed first. National policy changed to one of
creating reservations in the west and cajoling, coercing, or forcing
tribes, including western tribes as well as previously "removed" east-
ern tribes, to squeeze onto these reservations.
1. Treaties as Land Transactions
Between 1815 and 1871, when treaties were banned by Congress,
treaties looked increasingly like land exchange transactions. The Indi-
ans ceded to the United States aboriginal title to their hunting grounds
in return for title to specific reservation areas. After 1871, reservations
continued to be created, but by statute, agreement approved by Con-
gress, or executive order, rather than by treaty.51
2. Treaties Construed in Favor of Indians
[The lower court decided that] the Indians acquired no rights but
what any inhabitants of the territory or state would have. Indeed,
acquired no rights but such as they would have without the treaty. This
is certainly an impotent outcome to negotiations and a convention
which seemed to promise more, and give the word of the Nation for
more. And we have said we will construe a treaty with the Indians as
"that unlettered people" understood it .... 52
48. DOCUMENTS, supra note 17, at 47-48.
49. Letter written by Secretary of War John H. Eaton to a Cherokee delegation to the
Government (April 18, 1829), reprinted in id. at 46.
50. Control of Indian affairs was transferred from the Army to the newly created Department
of the Interior in 1849. This had only modest effect on the administration of policy, however
because the Indian Office in the Department the Army had become a civilian bureau in 1834. See
F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 119-20.
51. Id. at 127-28.
52. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905). Some state courts have obstinately
refused to follow the Supreme Court on treaty interpretation issues.
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Treaties and other documents creating reservations frequently con-
tained general, unspecific, and ambiguous terms. Rules of construc-
tion gradually evolved to aid in interpreting these documents, based on
the fact that the treaties and agreements were negotiated in English, a
strange language to the Indians, and used white man's legal concepts,
also unfamiliar to the Indians. These rules provided that treaties and
agreements were to be construed as the Indians understood them. 3
Executive orders and statutes were to be construed in favor of the
Indians. 4 The courts even read new provisions into treaties if the
intent of the parties could be so construed. 5 For example, where a
desert reservation was created with the intent that Indians become
capitalist farmers, the Supreme Court held that the treaty reserved suf-
ficient water from streams flowing along or across the reservation to
carry out the purposes of the reservation.5 6 In most cases, the United
States intended that the Indians become irrigation farmers. The
courts have held the tribes are entitled to sufficient water to irrigate all
the irrigable land on the reservation,5 7 or to propagate fish if that was
the Indian goal."
A treaty can only exist between independent, sovereign powers. Several generations ago
the United States government entered into a so-called treaty of peace with the nation of the
Ute Indians....
... Mhe descendants of the inhabitants of that nation are now citizens of the United
States.... [rhe] treaties are no longer of any force or effect....
Brough v. Appawora, 553 P.2d 934, 935 (Utah 1976), vacated, 431 U.S. 901 (1977).
The premise of Indian sovereignty we reject. The treaty is not to be interpreted in that
light. At no time did our ancestors in getting title to this continent ever regard the aborigi-
nes as other than mere occupants, and incompetent occupants, of the soil.
These arrangements [for treaties and reservations] were but the announcement of our
benevolence which, notwithstanding our frequent frailties, has been continuously displayed.
Neither Rome nor sagacious Britain ever dealt more liberally with their subject races than
we with these savage tribes, whom it was generally tempting and always easy to destroy and
whom we have so often permitted to squander vast areas of fertile land before our eyes.
State v. Towessnute, 89 Wash. 478, 481-82, 154 P. 805, 807 (1916).
53. See, eg., Winans, 198 U.S. at 380-81 (citing Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1
(1886)). Later, in Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658 (1979), the Court construed the Indians' treaty right to fish at their usual and
accustomed stations off the reservation "in common with the citizens of the territory" to mean
that today the treaty tribes are entitled to half the harvestable fish in most Washington waters.
Morisset, The Legal Standards for Allocating the Fisheries Resource 22 IDAHO L. REV. 609,
612-13 (1985-1986); see also F. COHEN, supra note I, at 221-24.
54. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 224.
55. Implied water rights exist whether the reservation was created by treaty, agreement,
executive order, or statute. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963).
56. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
57. Arizona; 373 U.S. at 601.
58. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1409 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1252




The reservation era in the United states lasted from roughly 1850 to
almost 1900. An occasional reservation was created thereafter, and
may still be created, but only by statute.59
3. The 1887 Allotment Act: Assimilation Accelerated
It is a part of the Indian's religion not to divide his land.
... [W]hen thirty or forty years shall have passed and these Indians
shall have parted with their title, they will curse the hand that was
raised professedly in their defense to secure this kind of legislation ....
This is a bill that, in my judgment, ought to be entitled "A bill to
despoil the Indians of their lands and to make them vagabonds on the
face of the earth." 6
Indian tribes [even today] face tremendous Congressional pressure to
sell their land, divide the assets, and disperse.
6 1
Prior to the 1860s, assimilation was a secondary national policy,
designed to absorb Indians into the larger society. When removal
became impossible, empty lands no longer remaining, the assimilation
policy became dominant. "Eastern philanthropists wanted to civilize
the Indian; western settlers wanted Indian land."' 2 The assimilation
policy gained strength through the 1860s and 1870s, culminating in
the Dawes Act, or General Allotment Act of 1887.63
Senator Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts favored the total Ameri-
canization of the Indian, to be accomplished by breaking up reserva-
tions. 6 The Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to allot tracts
59. The practice of creating Indian reservations by executive order was discontinued in 1919.
See Act of June 30, 1919, ch. 4, § 27, 41 Stat. 3, 34.
60. 11 CONG. REc. 780-81, 783, 934-35 (1881) (statement of Sen. Henry M. Teller during
the Senate debate on Land in Severalty (the Dawes Act)), reprinted in AMERICANIZING THE
AMERICAN INDIANS 134, 137 (F. Prucha ed. 1978).
61. V. DELORIA, JR., WE TALK You LISTEN-NEw TRIBES NEW TURF 115 (1970).
62. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 132.
63. General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 199, 24 Stat. 119 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341-42, 348-49, 354, 381 (1988)).
64. AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 60, at 6-7. Dawes had the
backing of the prestigious Lake Mohonk Conference that met annually during the 1880s and
later. The participants at these conferences were a tightly unified group who shared a common
outlook and who were religiously oriented, in the evangelical Protestant tradition. Id. at 8.
Prucha describes their goals:
All three of these main lines of Indian policy reform converged in one ultimate goal: the
total Americanization of the Indians. All were aimed at destroying Indianness, in whatever
form it persisted. The aim was to do away with tribalism, with communal ownership of
land, with the concentration of the Indians on reservations, with the segregation of the
Indians from association with good white citizens, with Indian cultural patterns, with native
658
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of reservation land to individual Indians, eighty acres to a single per-
son and 160 per couple, to encourage them to become farmers instead
of hunters and fishers. Congress reasoned that ownership of a plot of
land would automatically turn the Indians away from their communal
lifestyle to become farmers. The historian Francis Paul Prucha has
written that the Dawes Act was part of the "drive to individualize the
Indian that became the obsession of the late-nineteenth-century Chris-
tian reformers. ' 6  "Lacking all appreciation of the Indian cultures,
they were intent on forcing upon the natives the qualities that they
themselves embodied. It was an ethnocentrism of frightening inten-
sity, and it set a pattern that was not easily eradicated. 66
languages, with Indian religious rites and practices-in short, with anything that deviated
from the norms of civilization practiced and proclaimed by the white reformers themselves.
Failing to perceive a single element of good in the Indian way of life as it existed, they
insisted on a thorough transformation. The civilization which they represented must be
forced upon the Indians if they were unwilling to accept it voluntarily.
Ia at 7-8.
The Conference was made up of clergymen, iingressmen, academics, and public leaders. Ia
at 5-6. It had a strong religious orientation. Although a voluntary group, its views carried great
weight in setting national Indian policy. Ia at 9. Lyman Abbott, a noted Congregational clergy-
man, spoke at the conference saying that "it may be taken for granted that we [the conference
participants] are Christian men and women; that we believe injustice, good-will, and charity, and
the brotherhood of the human race." 1a at 32. He stated that the treaties and reservations
should be cancelled, and the reservation system was "hopelessly wrong." Ia at 35. "We have no
right to do a wrong because we have covenanted to [do so]." L at 33. Abbott suggested that
the treaties were expedient at the time they were negotiate, but should then be ignored. He
concluded that the reservation system was evil: "I hold to immediate repentance as a national
duty. Cease to do evil, cease instantly, abruptly, immediately. I hold that the reservation barri-
ers should be cast down and the land given to the Indians in severalty." Ad at 35.
William Strong, former United States Supreme Court Justice, disagreed about breaking the
treaties. Id at 40. Merrill E. Gates, president of Rutgers College, argued that Americans were
the Christian "children of the light." a. at 288. He concluded that Indian society was disdained
and contemptible; that tribes were political anomalies, unchristian and anticivilizing; and that the
reservations should be broken up. IA at 45-56.
Richard H. Pratt, a retired army officer who founded the famous Carlisle School in Penn-
sylvania for Indian children, said: "In a sense, I agree with the sentiment [that a good Indian is a
dead Indian], but only in this: that all the Indian there is in the race should be dead. Kill the
Indian in him, and save the man." IA at 260-61. Pratt was critical of missionaries for encourag-
ing Indians to remain separate and apart from white civilization, id. at 266, saying that "Carlisle
has always planted treason to the tribe [in its students] and loyalty to the nation at large." IA at
269.
65. F. PRUCHA, supra note 14, at 224.
66. Id at 199; see also H. JACKSON, CENTURY OF DISHONOR (1881) where she argued that
deeding tribal lands to individual Indians would simply result in loss of those lands to the white
community. This result may, indeed, have been one reason the law was passed, although most of
Congress apparently believed that allotment was best for the Indians too.
The main purpose of this bill is not to help the Indian, or solve the Indian problem, or
provide a method for getting out of our Indian troubles, so much as it is to provide a method
for getting at the valuable Indian lands and opening them up to white settlement.
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Indians were able to become United States citizens when they
received their allotments.67 If he/she were deemed "competent" the
allottee could apply for a fee patent after a period of years. Between
1910 and 1920, however, the Secretary of the Interior issued
thousands of "forced fees" to Indians who were not competent to
manage their land and who neither requested nor knew of the patent
issuance."
The Dawes Act was yet another disaster for the Indians.69 Often in
dire need of subsistence food and housing, especially during the period
from 1910 to 1920, the Indians lost their land after patent, by selling
or mortgaging to obtain cash.70 At the same time, a new federal policy
emerged that declared reservation lands "surplus" when not needed
for allotments. The government invited white settlers to homestead
these "surplus" lands. They often settled the best reservation lands.
As a result of the allotment, surplus land policies, and subsequent
refinements of the allotment policies, Indian land ownership dropped
from 138 million acres in 1887 to forty-eight million acres by 1934.
Moreover, Indians lost not only eighty percent or more of their land
value held in 1887, but more than eighty-five percent of the land value
of all the allotted lands as well. 71 Congress belatedly stopped the allot-
ment process with the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act.72
The allotment process created checkerboard land ownership on
many reservations, with fee simple, allotment tracts, and tribally
owned lands intermixed. Non-Indians now range from a small minor-
ity 73 to an overwhelming majority of the reservation population. 74
The Supreme Court has held these checkerboard reservations remain
H.R. REP. No. 1576, 46th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-10 (1880), reprinted in AMERICANIZING THE
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 60, at 128.
67. F. PRUCHA, supra note 14, at 226. In 1924, federal law bestowed citizenship on all
Indians born in the continental United States, if they did not already have this status (about two-
thirds were already citizens under earlier statutes) (Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1988))).
68. LaFave, South Dakota's Forced Fee Indian Land Claims: Will Landowners Be Liable for
Government's Wrongdoing?, 30 S.D.L. REV. 59 (1984).
69. F. PRUCHA, supra note 14, at 304.
70. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 136-37; F. PRUCHA, supra note 14, at 304-05.
71. Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
16-18 (1934) (memorandum of John Collier).
72. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 148.
73. For example, in 1974, the Navajo Reservation, most of which was not allotted, had a
Navajo population of approximately 150,000 and a non-Indian population of approximately
5,000. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL AND STATE INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND INDIAN
TRUST AREAS 63 (1974).
74. In 1978, the Port Madison Reservation was occupied by about 50 Indians and 3000 non-
Indians. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 n.1 (1978).
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Indian Country and that tribes still govern them.75 The presence of so
many non-Indians, however, has affected the Court's assessment of the
nature and extent of tribal governmental powers, especially where
these powers impact non-Indians who cannot vote in tribal elections.
Large non-Indian holdings have also enabled states to claim jurisdic-
tion over lands and activities on the reservation.76
4. The 1934 Indian Reorganization Act and Self-Determination
Some Indians proud of their race and devoted to their culture and
their mode of life have no desire to be as the white man is. They wish to
remain Indians, to preserve what they have inherited from their fathers
77
The Meriam Report of 1928 revealed the deplorable health, educa-
tion, and economic conditions of reservation Indians as well as the
adverse impact of the loss of most of their lands under the Dawes Act
and the surplus land policy. John Collier, a strong advocate for Indian
rights, was appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs in 1933. Collier used the Meriam Report to
lobby for passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 193478 which
stopped the allotment process. It was not retroactive, however, and
allotted land retains that same status today. The 1934 Act encouraged
economic development, enhanced self-determination and cultural
identity, and provided the tribes recognizable legal status. It enabled
75. Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
76. See, ag., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989), where the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the county to zone non-Indian owned land on
a checkerboarded but predominantly non-Indian owned part of the Yakima Reservation, at the
same time noting that the tribe had exclusive jurisdiction to zone the allotment and tribally
owned lands. The population on this portion of the reservation was about evenly split. The
court rejected a claim of concurrent jurisdiction, holding that the tribe lacked any power to zone
non-Indian owned lands in these circumstances. In Duro v. Reina, 110 S. CL 2053 (1990), the
Court denied tribal courts jurisdiction over non-member Indians emphasizing the voluntary
character of tribal membership and the fact that only members could participate in "tribal
government, the authority of which rests on consent." I, at 2064. But see Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, § 8077, Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1892 (1990), in which
Congress restored tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians for one year.
Non-members cannot vote in tribal elections, hold tribal office, or serve on tribal juries. The
Court has noted that the Bill of Rights of the Constitution does not apply in tribal courts, and
while the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988), does apply, it does
not give rise to a federal cause of action against the tribe for violations of its provisions. The only
remedy for someone denied their civil rights is either in tribal court, or by habeas corpus in
federal court. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 50 (1978).
77. Institute for Gov. Research (Brookings Inst.), THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN
ADMINISTRATION (MERIAM REPORT) (1928), reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 17, at 219.
78. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988).
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tribes to create governments with federally-approved constitutions,
that would be recognized by non-Indian bankers, and state and local
officials.7 9 Tribes began to create federally-chartered corporations to
engage in business activities.80 A new era appeared to shine on the
horizon. This is the first time Indians were given any choice about
whether to be affected by a national law. The Great Depression, how-
ever, curtailed the budget appropriations necessary to assist tribes to
achieve the Act's goals. World War II indefinitely delayed budget
allocations to the tribes.
5. The Termination Policy: Public Law 280
THESE PEOPLE SHALL BE FREE.81
By the end of World War II in 1945, national policy began again to
tilt toward the opposite pole. "Termination," enthusiastically
embraced by the 1953-1960 Eisenhower administration, became the
new national Indian policy. This policy curtailed the sovereignty and
governing powers of many Indian tribes, disbanded reservations, gave
states jurisdiction over Indians and their lands, and terminated all spe-
cial federal relationships with some Indians. Congress expressed its
intent in House Concurrent Resolution 108,82 adopted in 1953 by
unanimous vote of both houses.83
79. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 147.
80. Id.
81. Senator A. Watkins, 311 Annals 47-50, 55 (1957), reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note
17, at 239 (arguing in favor of termination of special federal relationships with Indian tribes).
82. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. B132 (1953) [hereinafter H.C.R. 108].
83. H.C.R. 108 states:
Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians
subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are
applicable to other citizens,... to end their status as wards of the United States, and to
grant them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship; and
Whereas the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States should assume their
full responsibilities as American citizens: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the House of
Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is declared to be the sense of Congress that,
at the earliest possible time, all of the Indian tribes and the individual members thereof
located within the states of California, Florida, New York, and Texas, and all of the
following named Indian tribes and individual members thereof, should be freed from
Federal supervision and control and from all disabilities and limitations specially applicable
to Indians: The Flathead Tribe of Montana, the Klamath Tribe of Oregon, the Menominee
Tribe of Wisconsin .... It is further declared to be the sense of Congress that, upon the
release of such tribes and individual members ... from such disabilities and limitations, all
offices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs ... whose primary purpose was to serve any Indian
tribe or individual Indian freed from Federal supervision should be abolished. It is further
declared to be the sense of Congress that the Secretary of the Interior should examine all
existing legislation dealing with such Indians, and treaties between the... United States and
each such tribe, and report to Congress at the earliest practicable date, but not later than
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Within a year after adopting H.C.R. 108, Congress began passing
individual acts dismantlingreservations. Some 109 tribes were eventu-
ally terminated,84 including two large tribes, the Menominee in Wis-
consin and the Klamath in southern Oregon. 5 In 1953, Congress
enacted Public Law 83-280 (P.L. 280) empowering states to assert
jurisdiction over reservations, with or without tribal consent.86 Many
states asserted such jurisdiction, 7 further eroding the prospects for
Indian self-government and autonomy.
6. Self-Determination Adopted as National Policy
Indians, Congress, and executive officials increasingly criticized ter-
mination during the late 1950s and early 1960s.8 8 By 1970, the pendu-
lum had swung through the arc again. Termination was roundly
discredited, to be replaced by a policy of self-determination and eco-
nomic self-sufficiency, more like Collier's original proposals in the
1934 Indian Reorganization Act. In 1970, President Richard Nixon
put the termination policy to rest:
Because termination is morally and legally unacceptable, because it
produces bad practical results, and because the mere threat of termina-
tion tends to discourage greater self-sufficiency among Indian groups, I
am asking the Congress to... expressly renounce, repudiate and repeal
the termination policy as expressed in House Concurrent Resolution108 ..... s9
President Nixon also proclaimed the new policy of self-determina-
tion, which has been embraced by all administrations since 1970.90
Support for termination still exists, however, and advocates of this
policy continue to seek new ways to express this philosophy. Barsh
has argued persuasively that the Department of Interior follows a pol-
January 1, 1954, his recommendations for such legislation as, in his judgment, may be
necessary to accomplish the purposes of this resolution.
Id.
84. See Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
139, 151 (1977).
85. lal Both tribes have since been restored to their former status by Congress. Menominee
Restoration Act of 1973, 25 U.S.C. §§ 903-903f (1988); Klamath Indian Tribe Restoration Act,
25 U.S.C. § 566.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1988).
87. See generally Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation
Indians, 22 UCLA L. REv. 535, 546-47 (1975).
88. See, eg., S. REP. No. 604, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973).
89. H.R. Doe. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970) (President Nixon's message to Congress
transmitting recommendations for Indian policy).
90. Id. at 4.
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icy of "administrative termination" of Indian tribes.91 The Secretary
has evolved a pattern of withdrawing federal services from a tribe and
then requiring that the tribe challenge this action by filing a petition
for "acknowledgment." 92 In this way, tribes' continuing eligibility for
federal services depends on their ability to satisfy spot checks.9" To
meet this onerous burden, the tribe must go through the same lengthy
and expensive evidence-gathering process required for tribes seeking
initial federal recognition.
94
7. Whittling Sovereignty Away: The Supreme Court's Recent Trend
a. Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction
The judiciary is simultaneously whittling away at both tribal legisla-
tion and judicial jurisdiction. Cases in the early 1800s held that,
because of their dependent status, the tribes had lost their capacity to
engage in international relations,95 and their ability to convey title to
real property without the consent of the United States.9 6 In 1883, the
Supreme Court held that a crime committed on a reservation by a
non-Indian against a non-Indian fell under state court rather than tri-
bal or federal court jurisdiction.97 Further, Congress has decided that
crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians should be tried in
the federal courts, although state law controls the trial.98 Jurisdiction
stood thus until 1978, when the Supreme Court decided Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 99 ruling that tribal courts did not have crimi-
nal jurisdiction over non-Indians who violate tribal codes on the reser-
vations. In 1990, the Supreme Court took an even more serious bite
out of tribal court jurisdiction by holding that tribal courts do not
have criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians, that is, Indians
91. Barsh, The Rocky Road to "Recognition," 4 ANN. W. INDIAN L. SYMP. 407, 416 (1990).
92. Id. at 414-16. See 25 C.F.R. § 83 (1990) (federal acknowledgment process).
93. Barsh, supra note 91, at 416.
94. Comment, The Imprimatur of Recognition: American Indian Tribes and the Federal
Acknowledgment Process, 66 WASH. L. REv. 209, 217-19 (1991).
95. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
96. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
97. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882).
98. Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1988); Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1152. Criminal jurisdiction on Indian reservations is very complicated. See Clinton, Criminal
Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIz. L. REv. 503
(1976).
99. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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who are members of other tribes."° Congress legislatively reversed
this decision in November 1990 for a period of one year.'01
Criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country is a confusing maze, raising
the question whether a competent law and order system is possible on
reservations. Matters are further complicated where states also exer-
cise jurisdiction under Public Law 280.102 The Yakima Tribe raised
this question in the Supreme Court in 1979. The Tribe argued that its
members were denied equal protection under the federal Constitution
because of the complexity in criminal law enforcement brought about
by P.L. 280 in Washington. The Supreme Court rejected the Yakima
argument, and in a holding remarkably insensitive to Indian aspira-
tions and to the federal policy of self-determination, volunteered in
dicta that if the tribe did not like the complicated partial jurisdiction
imposed by the state it could simply request full state jurisdiction." 3
b. Tribal Court Civil Jurisdiction: Preemption Analysis
In civil matters, a similar judicial trend is appitrent. Until 1973,
"sovereignty," as defined in Worcester v. Georgia, 1o shielded the tribes
against state law intrusions on the reservation. In Williams v. Lee, '05
the Court held that state law did not apply on reservations where it
"infringed on the right of the Indians to govern themselves." 106 Wil-
liams thus suggests a balancing approach to determine jurisdiction. In
McClanahan v. State Tax Commission, 17 however, the Court intro-
duced preemption analysis as a new method for determining whether
state law applies on Indian reservations. McClanahan relegated sover-
eignty to a "background" status. Preemption analysis, in most cases,
constitutes a balancing process. The issue is congressional intent but,
because congressional intent frequently is not spelled out, decisions
turn not on whether events took place in Indian Country, but instead
on the degree of "Indianness" of the events. If Indian interests are
100. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990).
101. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, § 8077, Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1892
(1990).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1988). For example, in Washington state,
P.L. 280 applies to Indians on fee patent land on the reservation, to non-Indians anywhere in
Indian country, and to Indians on trust land for certain subjects such as divorce, mental health,
and driving on public highways. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (1989). Thus jurisdiction
depends both on the geography of land ownership and on subject matter.
103. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S.
463, 499 (1979).
104. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556-57 (1832).
105. 358 U.S. 218 (1959).
106. ItL at 223.
107. 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
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strong and the state or local government interests are weak or modest,
the Court is likely to find preemption. If the reverse is true, then fed-
eral preemption will be rejected in favor of state jurisdiction. The
decisions of the present Supreme Court reflect a trend against finding
federal preemption.108 The Supreme Court instead appears headed
towards a goal of permitting Indians to govern only Indians and
Indian-owned lands. Indian governments will lack jurisdiction over
non-Indians or non-member Indians except in rare circumstances.
B. Canada
In contrast to the radical swings in Indian policy in the United
States,10 9 "the most singular feature of Canadian legislation concern-
ing Indians is that the governmental policy established therein, that of
'civilizing the Indians,' has shown almost no variation since the early
19th century when the government assumed responsibility for the soci-
ety and welfare of the Indian population." '
The national government explicitly announced an assimilation pol-
icy in the Civilization of Indian Tribes Act of 1857.111 This Act
authorized the "enfranchisement" of Indians who were "sufficiently
advanced," that is, who could assume the duties and responsibilities of
"citizens" and could support themselves, at which time they attained
108. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); see also Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
& Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989). Somewhat earlier cases appeared to
favor preemption. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980). But note that
Rehnquist dissented in those cases and the mix of court members has changed.
109. Some scholars argue that United States policy was quite consistent, at least until the
1970s. See R. BERKHOFER, supra note 15; B. DIPPLE, supra note 14.
110. Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, 27 BUFFALO L. REv. 581, 582 (1978) [hereinafter
Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada]; see also R. BARTLETT, INDIAN RESERVES AND
ABORIGINAL LANDS IN CANADA: A HOMELAND 25 (1990) [hereinafter R. BARTLETT, A
HOMELAND].
The exact numbers of Aboriginal people, in bands and on reserves in Canada, is unknown.
Recent data placed the registered Indian population at just over 300,000, among 573 bands
residing on 2,242 reserves. The 1981 census recorded 75,110 non-status Indians and 98,260
Metis. These figures are much disputed. See Morse, Aboriginal Peoples and the Law, in
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE LAW: INDIAN, METIS AND INUIT RIGHTS IN CANADA 5 (B.
Morse ed. 1985).
The precise number of treaties and agreements concluded between native groups and the
government is also unknown. The federal Department of Indian and Northern Affairs lists 67
treaties and 26 land grants concluded between 1680 and 1929. G. BROWN & R. MAGUIRE,
INDIAN TREATIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE xvi-xxiv (1979). Uncertainty exists, however,
because of the informal nature of early agreements, particularly in the Maritime provinces, and
the ambiguous nature of French treaty activity following discovery of Quebec territories. Id at
10, 20.
111. Ch. 26, 1857 Can. Stat. 84.
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the right to vote but lost their right to register as Indians.112 The
enfranchisement law was repealed in 1985. "There is now no way for
a person who is an Indian within the meaning of the Indian Act to
cease being one."1 3
Both Canada and the United States negotiated treaties with Aborig-
inal tribes. In eastern Canada, the French were the first to deal with
the First Nations.I" Unlike the British, the French made no pretense
of recognizing Aboriginal title to land. As a result, they signed no
land cession treaties in Quebec and the Maritime Provinces."' In
1763, following the British takeover of French lands, Great Britain
issued a Royal Proclamation announcing its first Aboriginal policy,
designed to minimize contact between Aboriginals and non-
Aboriginals.11 6 The Proclamation created a huge reserve in the west,
encompassing an area from southern Ontario to the Gulf of Mexico,
and from the Appalachian highlands to the Mississippi River. It also
provided that no one but the Crown could purchase land from the
Aboriginal tribes, and prohibited squatting or trespassing on Aborigi-
nal lands.' 17 The Proclamation was, however, limited geographically.
The Maritime Provinces ignored it altogether and the Proclamation's
coverage of the far West was uncertain.
Beginning in 1783, British policy toward First ,Nations changed
from protecting Indigenous people from white encroachment to
purchasing their lands for settlement and military purposes. This new
direction corresponded with a change in the way the British perceived
the First Nations. Their importance as warriors, either as allies or
enemies, decreased as the white population grew. They became less a
military presence and more a hindrance to white expansion. National
112. This was the era of active reservation creation in the United States, when tribes were
forced to stop their roaming and live on reservations. At the same time, in the United States,
there was an opposite undercurrent towards allotment and assimilation. Some of the pre-Dawis
Act allotments were accomplished by treaty and some by statute. Sometimes, similar to the
Canadian enfranchisement policy, "[a]llottees surrendered their interests in the tribal estate and
became citizens subject to state and federal jurisdiction." F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 130.
113. J. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 30.
114. G. BROWN & R. MAGuiRE, supra note 110, at 10.
115. S. WEAVER, MAKING CANADIAN INDIAN POLIcY-THE HIDDEN AGENDA 1968-1970,
at 32 (1981).
116. Royal Proclamation of 1763, CAN. REv. STAT. app. II, No. 1 (1985).
117. Id This prohibition against squatters and trespassers in Indian Country was ignored by
the miners and prospectors who refused to leave. NATrvrE RIGHTS IN CANADA 70, 71 (P.
Cumming & N. Mickenberg 2d ed. 1971). The United States also often failed to uphold its own
agreements with Indian tribes. See infra notes 232-42 and accompanying text.
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policy changed accordingly, as it did in the United States a few years
later. 1 1 8
"Until Confederation the imperial government put no restraints
upon the power of the [Canadian] colonies to control [First Nations']
reserves and lands. The [Indigenous people] had to look to the local
governments for protection of their lands and interests."'1 9
1. Assimilation Policy Formally Adopted
[W]hile the purpose of the Indian Act is to protect the rights and
interests of the Indians ... it is not right that the requirements of the
expansion of white settlement should be ignored, that is, that the right of
the Indian should be allowed to become a wrong to the white man.120
The Civilization of Indian Tribes Act of 1857 explicitly articulated
the policy of assimilation,12' although it had been national policy since
the 1830s in a more obscure form. 22 Under this policy, the govern-
ment first collected the Aboriginals onto reservations. Reserves were
meant to be temporary, useful merely to educate and Christianize the
Aboriginals and establish agriculture as their primary economic base.
This process, advocates argued, could accelerate assimilation by giving
the Aboriginals fee simple title to their property and engendering pride
of ownership. 23 By the 1840s, however, opponents defeated this pol-
icy by arguing that it would cause the Aboriginals to lose their land
and their reserves. 2 4 Interestingly, this debate took place in Canada
during the 1830s, while the United States was still preoccupied with
removal. Later, during the 1880s, when Congress considered the
Allotment Act, it rejected the argument that allotment would cause
the Indians to lose their land. Not until the 1920s and 1930s, after the
Indians had lost two-thirds of their land, did the United States admit
that this prediction was accurate.
Since the late 1800s, the Indian Act in Canada has been the primary
vehicle for dealing with First Nations in Canada. Bartlett traces the
form of the modern Indian Act 2' to an 1867 Act 12 6 and an 1869
118. G. BROWN & R. MAGUIRE, supra note 110, at 24-25.
119. R. BARTLETT, A HOMELAND, supra note 110, at 21.
120. Id. at 28 (quoting the Canada Minister of the Interior, House of Commons Deb., 3d
Sess., 11th Parl., 1 & 2 Geo. 5, at 7826 (1910-1911)).
121. Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, supra note 110, at 583 (citing 1857 Can. Stat., ch.
26).
122. Id. at 583 n.8.
123. R. BARTLETT, A HOMELAND, supra note 110, at 20-21.
124. Id.
125. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. I-5 (1985).
126. Department of the Secretary of State Act, ch. 42, 1868 Can. Stat. 91.
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amending statute entitled "Act for the Gradual Enfranchisement of
Indians and the Better Management of Indian Affairs."' 27 This
amendment gave the Superintendent General broad powers over
reserve lands and reserve income, giving only token encouragement to
Indian self-government. The government has insisted on dominating
governance and land rights'2 of First Nations, severely limiting First
Nations' rights and abilities to self-government. 129
The consolidation of Aboriginal laws first appears in the Indian Act
of 1876,130 but that Act contained little new material. In contrast, the
Dawes (Allotment) Act passed by the United States Congress just
eleven years later differed markedly from prior policy in establishing a
powerful national program of breaking up reservations through allot-
ments to individual Indians.
Comparison of Canadian and United States Indian policies during
the 1800s reveals that the differences stem both from demographic fac-
tors and from conscious choices in policy. Settlement came earlier in
the western United States than in western Canada, and this population
pressure caused problems that directed policy choices. In the United
States, pioneer migration into the Mississippi and Ohio valleys and the
South triggered the removal policy. Manifest destiny and the migra-
tion of prospectors and settlers into the West prompted creation of the
reservation policy. Assimilation in the United States was an early and
ongoing policy, but it was secondary until 1887, when the Dawes Act
was passed.
127. Ch. 6, 1869 Can. Stat. 22; see Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, supra note 110, at 583.
128. The omnipotence of the federal government in relation to Indian bands is unequivocally
expressed in section 18(1) of the Indian Act, CAN. REv. STAT. ch. I-5 (1985):
Subject to this Act, reserves are held by Her Majesty for the use and benefit of the
respective bands for which they were set apart, and subject to this Act and to the terms of
any treaty or surrender, the Governor in Council may determine whether any purpose [sic]
for which land in a reserve are used or are to be used is for the use and benefit of the band.
See Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, supra note 110, at 603.
In the United States, similar power over reservation lands is held by the federal government.
This results in part from the Trade and Intercourse Acts adopted by Congress from 1790 on, Act
of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, and partly from the guardian/ward relationship devel-
oped by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). See F.
CoHEN, supra note 1, at 510, 511 n.6. It is often said that Congress has "plenary" power over
Indians and Indian lands. The principal remedy for a tribe whose land is "taken" by the federal
government is a right to compensation.
129. The Indian Advancement Act, ch. 28, 1884 Can. Stat. 116, reflects this inconsistency. It
provided for wider powers for the Band Councils, including the raising of money, but then
appointed the government's Indian Agent Chairman of the Council.
130. Ch. 18, 1876 Can. Stat. 43. It is interesting to note that it was also in 1876 that the battle
of Little Bighorn took place, where Custer and his troops were defeated by the Sioux.
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2 Treaty Interpretation in Canada
The Canadian government, created in 1867, continued Britain's
practice of signing treaties with the First Nations. The same year that
Congress barred further treaties with Indian tribes in the United
States, 1871, marks the beginning of Canada's most active treaty-mak-
ing period. The Robinson Treaties, covering the northwestern part of
upper Canada, were signed in 1850.131 Between 1850 and 1853, Van-
couver Island bands signed fourteen treaties covering about one-forti-
eth of the island. Between 1871 and 1921, all of the "numbered"
treaties were signed, covering vast tracts of interior Canada, the larg-
est area touched by treaties. The signing of Treaty 11 in 1921 essen-
tially concluded the treaty making era in Canada. 132 Approximately
half the aboriginally occupied lands of Canada, including most of Brit-
ish Columbia, the Yukon, the Northwest Territories, and parts of
Quebec, were never the subject of treaties, and the treaties in the Mari-
times established peace and friendship between the parties, rather than
land surrenders.1 33
Rules of construction for treaty interpretation in Canada are very
much like the rules applied by courts in the United States. Treaties
with Indigenous peoples are often ambiguous, and sometimes leave out
terms clearly intended, such as the right to use waters on or adjacent
to the reserve. The courts apply rules of construction to interpret
these ambiguities and omissions. Ordinarily the "plain meaning" of
the words in an agreement will control.13  The Supreme Court of
Canada, however, recently held that "plain meaning" interpretation is
inappropriate for Indian treaties and statutes. In Nowegyick v. The
Queen, 135 a unanimous Court declared that "treaties and statutes
relating to Indians should be liberally construed and doubtful expres-
sions resolved in favor of the Indians.. ...,, 3' Affirming this principle
131. G. BROWN & R. MAGUIRE, supra note 110, at xxv.
132. See ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE LAW, supra note 110, at xxxix-xlv (Chronology of
Key Events).
133. S. WEAVER, supra note 115, at 36.
134. See, eg., R. v. Johnston, 56 D.L.R.2d 749, 752 (Sask. 1966).
135. [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29. The Court quoted from the landmark United States case of Jones v.
Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899) where "it was held that Indian treaties 'must... be construed, not
according to the technical meaning of [their] words ... but in the sense in which they would
naturally be understood by the Indians.'" Id. at 36.
136. Id. This principle was recently stated in Horseman v. The Queen, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901.
Horseman, an Indian, went moose hunting to feed his family, pursuant to a treaty right. He shot
and killed a moose, skinned it, and hurried home to obtain assistance from other Band members
to haul it out of the bush. When they arrived a grizzly bear was eating the moose, claiming
"valid possessory title." Id. at 924. Faced with a conflicting claim, the bear charged Horseman,
who displayed cool courage and skill under attack by shooting and killing the charging bear. He
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in R. v. Simon, the Court approved not only the principle of resolving
doubtful expressions in favor of the Indians, but also held that these
agreements should be interpreted as the Indians understood them.137
These rules of construction are consistent with those applied by
United States courts. 138
The recent decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in Attorney
General of Quebec v. Regent Sioui,139 adds significantly to Canadian
treaty law. Defendant Sioui and other Huron Indians were convicted
of cutting down trees, camping, and making fires in places contrary to
regulations of the Jacques-Cartieri Park." Defendants admitted the
acts charged but claimed they were practicing ancestral religious rites
which were the subject of a treaty between the Hurons and the Brit-
ish.141 The document in question is only one paragraph long,'42 and
fails to describe the territory covered. The Court held the document
was a treaty, that it had not expired from lack of use, and that it had'
not been extinguished by laws creating and regulating the Jacques-
Cartier Park. The Court spoke against extinguishment in strong
terms:
skinned the bear and took the hide. Horseman did not have a license to hunt grizzly bears or sell
their hides. A year later, in spring of 1984, Horseman found himself out of work and in need of
money to support his family. Under this financial pressure he decided to sell the grizzly hide.
Before doing so he applied for and was issued a grizzly bear hunting license entitling him to hunt
and kill one bear and sell the hide to a licensed dealer. He made use of the license to sell the hide
of his adversary of the year before to a licensed dealer for $200. He was then charged with a
crime.
The majority of the Supreme Court upheld Horseman's conviction, stating that his treaty
hunting rights had been limited by the Albert Natural Resources Transfer Agreement of 1930,
under which he could hunt only for food. Id. at 932-36. Horseman received the minimum fine.
Id at 926.
137. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, 402; see also R. v. White & Bob, 52 W.W.R. 193, 232-33 (B.C.
1965), aff'd, 1965 S.C.R. vi; R. v. Taylor & Williams, 34 O.R.2d 360, 367 (1981).
138. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908). On treaty interpretation
generally, see Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: '"4s Long As
Water Flows, Or Grass Grows Upon The Earth"--How LongA Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REV.
601 (1975).
139. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025.
140. Id. at 1030.
141. Id at 1031.
142. The treaty states:
THESE are to certify that the CHIEF of the HURON tribe of Indians, having come to
me in the name of His Nation, to submit to His BRITTANICK MAJESTY, and make
Peace, has been received under my Protection, with his whole Tribe; and henceforth no
English Officer or party is to molest, or interrupt them in returning to their Settlement at
LORETrE; and they are received upon the same terms with the Canadians, being allowed
the free Exercise of their Religion, their Customs, and Liberty of trading with the English;
- recommending it to the Officers commanding the Posts, to treat them kindly.
Id.
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It must be remembered that a treaty is a solemn agreement between
the Crown and the Indians, an agreement the nature of which is sacred
.... The very definition of a treaty thus makes it impossible to avoid
the conclusion that a treaty cannot be extinguished without the consent
of the Indians concerned. Since the Hurons had the capacity to enter
into a treaty with the British, therefore, they must be the only ones who
could give the necessary consent to its extinguishment . .143
The Court followed Simon in construing this minimal and incomplete
treaty in favor of the Indians.
The province also argued that a different treaty, the Treaty of Paris,
signed by England and France on February 10, 1763, abrogated the
treaty between the Hurons and the English. The Court rejected this
argument, however, holding that "England and France could not val-
idly agree to extinguish a treaty between the Hurons and the English
.... -144 This is, of course, a very different position from that taken by
the United States cases, which hold that although treaties are the
supreme law of the land, a treaty with an Indian tribe may be abro-
gated either by later statute, or later treaty.145
In Sioui, the Attorney General of Quebec argued that the territorial
scope of the treaty did not extend to cover the park.146 The Hurons
argued that the treaty gave them personal rights, which included the
right to practice religion in the park, as part of the territory they occu-
pied in 1760.147 The Attorney General of Canada argued that treaty
rights equalled territorial rights. The Court rejected both extremes
and held that the treaty covered an area large enough to meet the
Hurons' need to exercise their religious practices and customs, includ-
ing sites within the park, "so long as the carrying on of the customs
and rights is not incompatible with the particular use made by The
Crown of this territory." '48 It was "up to the Crown" to prove that it
could not accommodate its occupancy of the territory to reasonable
exercise of the Hurons' rights. 149
For the exercise of rites and customs to be incompatible with the
occupancy of the park by the Crown, it must not only be contrary to
the purpose underlying that occupancy, it must prevent the realization
of that purpose.
143. Id. at 1063 (citation omitted).
144. Id.
145. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 63.
146. [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 1066.
147. Id. at 1066-67.
148. Id. at 1070.
149. Id. at 1072.
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First, we are dealing with Crown lands, lands which are held for the
benefit of the community. Exclusive use is not an essential aspect of
public ownership. Second, I do not think that the activities described
seriously compromise the Crown's objectives in occupying the park....
[The unique qualities of this area are not threatened.] These activities
... present no obstacle to cross-country recreation. 150
The Court concluded that the Attorney General had failed to establish
that the park purposes were incompatible with the exercise of Huron
rites and customs.151
In light of the rulings and language in Sioui and Horseman there is
serious doubt whether Parliament has power to modify or extinguish a
First Nation's treaty without the consent of that Nation, except where
the federal action is taken for the benefit of the Indigenous people or
with their consent. Sioui teaches that the courts will carefully scruti-
nize legislation concerning treaties to ensure that it is indeed for the
benefit of the Native Americans, or at least not detrimental without
justification.'5 2 This is consistent with current Canadian government
policy of negotiating with tribes for settlement of Aboriginal claims.
In the United States, by comparison, the courts have not deviated
from Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock which held that Congress has plenary
power to abrogate Indian treaties if it chooses to do so for any reason
whatsoever.'53 Further, the courts will not review legislation to assure
that it advances the government's trust responsibility, or benefits the
Indians.
3. Subjugation Under the Indian Act
The Great Depression of the 1930s "appears to have been the high
water mark of government regulation and interference in the daily
lives" of the Canadian Indians.1 54  Parliament made numerous
detailed amendments to the Indian Act before and during the Depres-
sion years. Only a few have been made since. None of the amend-
ments changed the basic policy of "civilizing" the Indigenous peoples
and denying the First Nations meaningful self-government.15 5
In the United States, the 1950s were dominated by the termination
policy. In Canada, 1951 was significant for passage of a new Indian
150. Id at 1073.
151. Id
152. " he very definition of a treaty thus makes it impossible to avoid the conclusion that a
treaty cannot be extinguished without the consent of the Indians concerned." Id at 1063.
153. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
154. Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, supra note 110, at 585.
155. R. BARTLErr, A HOMELAND, supra note 110, at 177-78.
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Act, 5 6 which, for all its changes, looked more like the 1868 Indian
Act than anything new."5 7 It increased the imposition of provincial
laws and standards on First Nations. The new Act did remove some
of the cultural control and lessened excess government control of local
affairs on the reserves, but it did not alter the policy of encouraging
assimilation through award of citizenship. Nor did the Act bestow
any broader powers of self-government on First Nations. The concept
of termination, as conceived in the United States, did not reach Can-
ada until 1969, and then was short-lived, appearing only as a "pro-
posed" policy without any follow-up legislative implementation."5 '
In the United States, self-determination became the dominant
national policy by the late 1960s. The Indian Civil Rights Act,
enacted in 1968, permitted tribal retrocession from state jurisdiction
under P.L. 280 and enhancement of tribal courts. In 1970, President
Nixon made his landmark speech flatly rejecting termination and
endorsing a strong and comprehensive policy of self-determination for
Indian tribes.
4. Termination in Canada: A Short-Lived "Era"
In the late 1960s, while the United States was moving rapidly
towards self-determination, Canada was going in the opposite direc-
tion. In 1969, the Canadian government issued a policy statement
called a "White Paper" on Indian Policy. 5 9 This Paper set forth a
formula for termination and reads remarkably like H.C.R. 108"°
adopted by the United States Congress in 1953 to launch the termina-
tion era. Bartlett describes the White Paper:
[The Paper] ... declared that total assimilation must occur within a
short period of time-the Indian Affairs Branch should be abolished in
five years. All legislation specially pertaining to Indians was to be
repealed, thereby denying special rights of Indians. Instead, all services
were to be provided by the provinces; the statement rejected treaties and
land-claims as insignificant in the debate on the future of the Indians.
The Federal Government's goal of total assimilation would be accom-
plished according to the Statement, by short-term economic aid. The
1969 Policy did not contain any major positive suggestions regarding the
156. Ch. 29, 1951 Can. Stat. 131.
157. Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, supra note 110, at 586.
158. STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA ON INDIAN POLICY (1969).
159. Id.
160. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. B132 (1953); see supra notes 82-83.
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well-being of the Indians. Its essence was the severing of all ties between
the Indians and the Federal Government. 1 61
The 1969 White Paper generated immediate opposition. In 1970,
the Indian Chiefs of Alberta presented their "Red Paper" 62 to the
Trudeau cabinet, opposing the entire concept of termination and argu-
-ing for greater recognition of treaty rights, Aboriginal claims, and
rights to self-government. Passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settle-
ment Act in 1971 influenced Canadian policy, as did the Calder case,
decided in 1973. On August 8, 1973, shortly after Calder was decided,
"the federal government issued a Statement on Aboriginal Claims, in
which it declared its willingness to negotiate" these claims with First
Nations peoples.' 63 The 1969 White Paper proposal was dead. In
1977, the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline inquiry, headed by Thomas Ber-
ger, recommended recognition and settlement of native claims." In
1981, the federal government further developed its policy in a publica-
tion titled In All Fairness: A Native Claims Policy, Comprehensive
Claims. 165
5. Canada Begins To Recognize Aboriginal Rights
In the 1970s, Canadian policy began to reverse itself. The 1973 Cal-
der 166 decision posed the very real possibility that the courts might
recognize Indian claims to aboriginal titles and rights. In 1982, Can-
ada adopted a new Constitution Act. Section 35(1) of the Act recog-
nized and affirmed First Nation Aboriginal rights. In 1990, the
Sparrow Court interpreted this language to mean that Aboriginal fish-
ing rights are not extinguished merely because they are regulated in
detail, and that the government has a heavy fiduciary duty, reviewable
in the courts, when dealing with Aboriginal rights. Sparrow represents
a remarkable turnaround for Canada.
6. Academics and Lawyers Take Up the Indian Cause
The Sparrow decision is unusual in the Court's heavy reliance on
academic writings to support its analysis. The Court notes that:
161. Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, supra note 110, at 588.
162. Ide at 588-89.
163. R. BARTLETr, A HOMELAND, supra note 110, at 49.
164. Id
165. CANADA, DEP'T OF INDIAN AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS (1981); see R. BARTLETT, A
HOMELAND, supra note 110 at 51.




[Until 1966] there was a virtual absence of discussion of any kind of
Indian rights to land even in academic literature. By the late 1960s,
Aboriginal claims were not even recognized by the federal government
as having any legal status .... It took a number of judicial decisions
and notably the Calder case in this court (1973) to prompt a reassess-
ment of the position being taken by government.
167
The Court then cites and quotes from numerous academic articles,
all written after 1980, when academics realized that these problems
should be studied.16 In the United States, a similar pattern of schol-
arship emerges, although the Canadian scholarship has influenced the
Canadian Supreme Court more profoundly. Cohen published his
landmark treatise, Handbook of American Indian Law, in 1942. It
was revised ineptly in 1957, but remained virtually the only example of
legal scholarship with regard to Indian law until the 1970s. The field
was then "discovered" by academics and, since 1975, dozens of fine
articles and books have appeared.1 69
Paralleling the discovery of this field by academics has been the dis-
covery and participation in the field by competent Indian and non-
Indian lawyers. Competent legal representation has had a significant
impact on the achievement of Indian goals. Until the 1960s competent
legal counsel were seldom available to Indian tribes.1 70 They were rel-
167. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1103-04.
168. B. SCHWARTZ, FIRST PRINCIPLES, SECOND THOUGHTS 353--64 (1986); Little Bear, A
Concept of Native Title, 2-3 CAN. LEGAL AID BULL. 99 (1982); Lyon, An Essay on
Constitutional Interpretation, 26 OSOODE HALL L.J. 95 (1988); McNeil, The Constitutional
Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, 4 Sup. CT. L. Rv. 255 (1982); Pentney, The Rights
of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada in the Constitution Act, 1982, Part II, Section 35: The
Substantive Guarantee, 22 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 207 (1988); Sanders, Pre-Existing Right:
The Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, in THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
(2d ed. 1989); Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal Rights, 66 CAN. B. REv. 727 (1987); Slattery,
The Hidden Constitution: Aboriginal Rights in Canada, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 361 (1984). This is
not to suggest that academics always, or even usually, turn out to be any more enlightened than
anyone else. In this instance, however, they have served an important purpose in revealing the
legal, social, and economic mistreatment of Canadian and United States Indians.
169. F. COHEN, supra note 1; M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN
(2d ed. 1983); R. STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS-CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO
COURT (1975); WILKINSON, supra note 18; Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust
Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975); Clinton, supra note 98; Collins, Indian
Allotment Water Rights; 20 LAND & WATER L. REv. 421 (1985); Getches, Water Rights on
Indian Allotments, 26 S.D.L. REv. 405 (1981); Johnson, The States Versus Indian Off-
Reservation Fishing: A United States Supreme Court Error, 47 WASH. L. REv. 207 (1972);
Johnson & Crystal, Indians and Equal Protection, 54 WASH. L. REV. 587 (1979); Strickland, The
Absurd Ballet of American Indian Policy or American Indian Struggling with Ape on Tropical
Landscape: An Afterword, 31 ME. L. REv. 213 (1979).
170. Attorneys for the Solicitor's office were sometimes dedicated and competent, and
sometimes not. Frequently, they were, and are, up against highly competent, and highly paid
private counsel when negotiating natural resources agreements on reservations. Government
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egated to relying on government counsel who had unfettered discre-
tion as to whether to represent a tribe in a given case. The government
lawyers are located in the Solicitor's office and the Department of Jus-
tice and have (with a few recent exceptions) established a very check-
ered history of advocacy on behalf of Indian tribes.
The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s produced a cadre
of young, capable lawyers dedicated to minority causes, some of whom
became expert in the unique field of Indian law. Lawyers in the Office
for Economic Opportunity (War on Poverty Legal Service Program)
became knowledgeable in Indian law. By 1969, some forty Legal Serv-
ices lawyers were working on reservations throughout the nation.1
7 1
More importantly, the University of New Mexico law student pro-
gram172 encouraged several hundred Indians themselves to attend law
schools throughout the country. Most of these lawyers have returned
to work on behalf of their communities. Law schools began teaching
federal Indian law only in the late 1960s and early 1970s.' 7 1 It is now
a widely taught subject in western law schools. Law school
casebooks 7 and law review articles began to appear during the same
period. In 1982, the revised edition of the 1942 "Felix S. Cohen's
Handbook of Federal Indian Law" was published after being com-
pletely rewritten over a seven year period. 75
attorneys are hampered by conflicts of interest, as where they advise both the Bureau of Indian
Affairs and the Bureau of Reclamation on water allocation disputes.
The other group of lawyers who became expert in aspects of Indian law represented tribes in
claims before the United States Indian Claims Commission. These attorneys became specialists
on the historic claims of tribes, what lands the tribes originally occupied, and when and how the
United States "took" those lands. Only a few claims attorneys became involved in current
Indian litigation. U.S. INDIAN CLAIMS COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 21 (1978).
171. Price, Lawyers on the Reservation: Some Implications for the Legal Profession, 1969 LAW
& Soc. ORD. 161.
172. Twenty-five to thirty-five Indian pre-law students have attended the summer program at
the University of New Mexico Indian Law Center each year since 1968. After a six week
summer introduction to law they attend law schools throughout the nation.
173. Professor Fred Hart, University of New Mexico, and Professor Monroe Price, UCLA
Law School, began to teach this subject in 1971. The author started teaching Indian law in 1969.
174. Monroe Price of UCLA Law School, authored the first such casebook, LAW AND THE
AMERICAN INDIAN (1973). This book has been revised and the third edition is now co-authored
by Robert Clinton and Nell Newton. D. Getches and C. Wilkinson have published a casebook,
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (2d ed. 1986).
175. The original treatise was published in 1942 and was authored by Felix S. Cohen. It
became the dominant authority in the field. The 1982 edition was written by a group of academic
scholars. The board of authors and editors includes Rennard Strickland, editor-in-chief, Charles
F. Wilkinson, managing editor, Reid Peyton Chambers, Richard B. Collins, Carole E. Goldberg-
Ambrose, Robert N. Clinton, David H. Getches, Ralph W. Johnson, and Monroe E. Price.
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In 1966, Congress enacted a law permitting Indian tribes to file suit
in their own names if the United States declined to sue for them.176
Many such suits were filed. In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States
dedicated more resources to litigation on the Indians' behalf. The
Native American Rights Fund (NARF) in Boulder, Colorado, created
in 1968, provides exceptional legal talent to tribes around the
nation. 177 The totality of these changes means that Indian tribes, for
the first time, have access to competent legal assistance, an accessibil-
ity that is essential for survival in modem United States. Treaty, stat-
utory and other rights held by the tribes, long dormant, are now
increasingly recognized and enforced by the courts.
III. ABORIGINAL RIGHTS
A. The United States
Conquest gives a title which the courts of the conqueror cannot deny
.... The conqueror prescribes its limits .... [T]he Indian inhabitants
are to be considered merely as occupants ... incapable of transferring
the absolute title to others. 178
In the United States the issues surrounding aboriginal title have
nearly all been resolved, through treaty cessions and through the 1946
Indian Claims Commission Act. In Canada, these issues are now at
center stage and are the major preoccupation of the Indian
community.
Aboriginal rights and titles are recognized in both Canada and the
United States. In Johnson v. M'Intosh, Justice Marshall affirmed the
existence of such title:
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a
legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it accord-
ing to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as
independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to
dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was
denied by the original fundamental principle that discovery gave exclu-
sive title to those who made it. 17 9
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988).
177. Started by David H. Getches as a spin-off of California Indian Legal Services, it
continues its tradition of excellence under the leadership of John Echohawk. NARF employs
about 20 lawyers. It generally is involved in about 70 cases at any one time, throughout the
nation.
178. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588-91 (1823).
179. Id. at 574.
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The Supreme Court has stated that the Indians' right of occupancy
is "as sacred as the fee-simple of the whites."1 0 The Indians' posses-
sory right is a "federal" right,"'1 so that a tribe is entitled to recover
rent from a persistent trespasser on Indian title land."8 2
Indian aboriginal claims are founded on immemorial custom. Such
claims are proven by establishing exclusive use and occupancy of the
land1 13 from time immemorial,"' which the court defines as prior to
the assertion of sovereignty by the United States."8 5 The Ninth Circuit
has held that proof of aboriginal hunting and fishing rights can create
possessory rights in Native Villages of Alaska."8 6
Aboriginal title is good against all but the United States, which has
the exclusive power to extinguish such title.18 7 While Indians are
generally not entitled to compensation when aboriginal title is extin-
guished by the United States, 88 Congress usually awards compensa-
tion as a matter of policy. Once Indian title has been recognized by
treaty, agreement, or statute, compensation is required when the title
is taken by the United States.18 9 This is not true of executive order
reservations. 90
Very few aboriginal title claims remain unsettled in the United
States.191 The federal government largely abolished Indian title dur-
ing the reservation era, 1850-1857, forcing Indian tribes to give up
their ancestral hunting grounds in return for "recognized" title to res-
ervations. Throughout the first half of this century, Indian tribes bit-
terly complained that they were forced, coerced, or induced by fraud
180. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835).
181. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 670 (1974).
182. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 236 (1985).
183. United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 46 (1946).
184. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184
(1966).
185. Village of Gambell v. Clark, 746 F.2d 572, 574 (9th Cir. 1984).
186. Alaska v. Udall, 420 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1969).
187. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
188. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 313 (1955).
189. United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
190. See Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86 (1949); Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 315 U.S. 317 (1942). In spite of those cases, the "modem practice" of Congress has been
to provide compensation to tribes for the taking of property on executive order reservations. F.
COHEN, supra note 1, at 496.
191. One such claim was recently put forth by several Alaska Native Villages to aboriginal
hunting and fishing rights on the outer continental shelf. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act of 1971 (ANCSA) abolished all aboriginal hunting, fishing, and land rights of Natives "in
Alaska." 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1988). The Ninth Circuit held, in Village of Gambell v.
Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1989), that the outer continental shelf is not "in Alaska."
Thus aboriginal rights on the outer shelf were not abolished by ANCSA.
679
Washington Law Review
to leave their ancestral lands and move onto reservations, and main-
tained that the United States should return the land or at least pay for
the taking. Before 1946, such claims could not be fied in court unless
Congress passed special legislation waiving sovereign immunity and
authorizing suit on each claim. 192 Over 140 such special bills had been
passed. Deciding this process was too cumbersome, 93 Congress, in
1946, enacted the Indian Claims Commission Act 194 establishing a
special forum to settle Indian claims without special legislation for
each lawsuit. The Commission made monetary awards to several hun-
dred tribes between 1946 and 1978,' 9 thereby resolving most aborigi-
nal claims. A few claims remained against states19 6 or subdivisions of
states, 97 based on violation of the Trade and Intercourse Acts198 for
entering into treaties or agreements with Indian tribes in the late
1700s.
B. Canada
The Canadian law of Aboriginal rights remained fairly constant
throughout the Canadian history until the 1973 decision in Calder, 199
the Constitution Act of 1982,20 and the 1990 Supreme Court decision
in Sparrow v. The Queen.2 ° I
1. Canadian Hostility Toward Aboriginal Rights
Prior to the 1982 Constitution Act, the federal government had
both unilateral and exclusive power to deal with, or terminate, Aborig-
192. See F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 160.
193. U.S. INDIAN CLAIMS COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 2-3 (1978).
194. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat. 1049. The
Commission terminated in 1978 (omitted at 25 U.S.C. § 70v (1988)).
195. These damage awards were challenged by various Indian tribes. The tribes objected to
the fact that (1) they could only obtain money damages under the Act, they could not reclaim the
land, (2) they received the value of their land at the date it was taken, usually sometime in the
1800s, (3) they received no interest on this valuation after the date of the taking, (4) the United
States ardently contested each claim, sometimes attempting to offset the cost to the government
of "removing" the tribe from its eastern homeland to Indian territory in the West, and (5) the
Commission would only entertain claims by tribes, not individual Indians. See generally U.S.
INDIAN CLAIMS COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 1-21 (1978).
196. See Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (Ist Cir.
1975) (tribal claim against the state of Maine).
197. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
198. Several of the Acts were passed by Congress in the late 1700s and early 1800s. See, eg.,
Trade and Intercourse Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 329. They provided that no agreement with an Indian
tribe could be valid unless approved by Congress.
199. 1973 S.C.R. 313, aff'g 74 W.W.R. 481 (B.C. 1970).
200. CAN. REV. STAT. app. II, No. 44 (1985).
201. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
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inal title and rights.2 ° 2 The 1867 Constitution Act provides that the
federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians and lands
reserved for Indians."2 0 3 The federal government retains exclusive
power to deal with Aboriginal rights, as against the provinces, but that
power is now constrained by the 1982 Constitution Act.
The Canadian government has recently declined to extinguish title
without consent. By negotiating settlements of Aboriginal claims, it
has engaged in a process with all the earmarks of earlier treaty negoti-
ations.2° Several settlement agreements have been concluded in
recent years.
20 5
Because treaties covered only about half the nation, First Nations
still assert claims of Aboriginal title to large areas of Canada. Until
recently, the Canadian government looked unkindly on attempts to
assert or litigate these Aboriginal claims. In 1927, for example, the
Indian Act was amended making it a "federal crime to take Indian
claims to court, to raise money to pursue Indian claims or in fact to
organize to pursue Indian claims. ' 206 Although this provision was
repealed in the 1930s, the federal government believed as late as 1969
that Aboriginal claims were so ill-defined that "it is not realistic to
think of them as specific claims capable of remedy. '2 7 By 1973, the
Canadian government's perspective had altered. The government rec-
ognized Aboriginal title when it indicated a commitment to negotiate
outstanding claims, including those based on Aboriginal title.208
202. J. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 138-39; see, eg., R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075,
1097-99; see also, R. v. Derrickson, [1976] 2 S.C.R. v, 71 D.L.R.3d 159 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1976),
aff'g 60 D.L.R.3d 140 (B.C. 1975); Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, supra note 110, at 581.
203. CAN. REV. STAT. app. II, No. 5, § 91(24) (1985).
204. It seems clear that the constitution authorizes cession of Aboriginally held lands as part
of a voluntary settlement and no further constitutional amendment is necessary to accomplish
this. P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 565-66 (2d ed. 1985).
205. See, eg., CANADA, EDITEUR OFFICIEL DU QUEBEC, THE JAMES BAY AND NORTHERN
QUEBEC AGREEMENT (1976), and CANADA, DEP'T OF INDIAN AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS, THE
WESTERN ARCTIC CLAIM-THE INUVIALUYT FINAL AGREEMENT (1984). The Inuvialiut
Agreement came into force after the 1982 Constitution Act and has been constitutionalized, as
was the James Bay Agreement.
206. Many Fingers, Commentarie" Aboriginal Peoples and the Constitution, 19 ALTA. L.
REv. 428, 429 (1981). The potlach tradition of the Six Nations of Iroquois was outlawed by the
Canadian government and jail sentences handed down to all violators; attendance at potlatch
functions was prohibited by law as late as 1951. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 114 (1886) (repealed
1951). See CANADA HOUSE OF COMMONS, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON INDIAN SELF-
GOVERNMENT, INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 13 (1983) [hereinafter INDIAN SELF-
GOVERNMENT].
207. STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA ON INDIAN POLICY (1969).
208. Morse, The Resolution of Land Claims, in ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE LAW, supra
note 110, at 617.
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2. Recent Canadian Recognition of Aboriginal Rights
In 1973 the Supreme Court started down the path toward recogniz-
ing Aboriginal rights when it decided Calder v. Attorney-GeneraL2'9
The Nishga people of northwestern British Columbia sought a decla-
ration that they had Aboriginal title to their land and that this title
had not been terminated. The Nishgas based their claim on the fact
that their ancestors had occupied and used the land from time imme-
morial. Justice Hall, speaking for three members of the Supreme
Court of Canada, agreed that the Nishgas had existing Aboriginal title
derived from original occupancy and use.21° Justice Judson, speaking
for three other members of the Court, held that whatever title the
Nishgas may have had had since been terminated. 2" Justice Pigeon,
the seventh judge, wanted to dismiss the Nishgas' application because
the Tribe had failed to comply with a British Columbia statute requir-
ing the Lieutenant Governor's consent to litigation involving the
Crown's title to land.212 Because of the 3-3 stalemate between the
other judges on the substantive issues, Pigeon's procedural argument
is the sole reason Calder is binding legal authority. The real signifi-
cance of Calder, however, lies in its ruling that Aboriginal title is not
necessarily limited to the confines of the Royal Proclamation of 1763,
but may be based on the concept of prior occupation of lands.21
Until 1982, it was generally assumed that the Canadian government
could unilaterally abrogate Aboriginal rights and title. Section 91(24)
of the 1867 Constitution Act stood as authority for this position. This
section granted the federal government jurisdiction over "Indians, and
Lands reserved for the Indians. '21 4 This view has changed with the
adoption of the 1982 Constitution Act, which provides in section 35(1)
that "[t]he existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peo-
ples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed."21
The 1982 Constitution Act appears to "constitutionalize" Aborigi-
nal and treaty rights prospectively. Extinguishments that occurred
prior to 1982 are still effective, but future attempts by Parliament to
extinguish or alter such rights would be void. In 1985, Hogg wrote
that section 35:
209. 1973 S.C.R. 313.
210. Id. at 375, 422 (Hall, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 333, 344.
212. Id. at 426-27 (Pigeon, J., concurring).
213. See Guerin v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 376-77.
214. British North America Act, 1867, CAN. REV. STAT. app. II, No. 5 (1985); see, eg., J.
WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 88, 94, 95.
215. Constitution Act, 1982, CAN. REV. STAT. app. II, No. 44, § 35(1) (1985).
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operates as a limitation on the legislative power of both the federal Par-
liament and the provincial Legislatures: neither level of government is
competent to impair aboriginal or treaty rights. The entrenchment of
aboriginal or treaty rights means... that future extinguishments of such
rights could be implemented only by the process of constitutional
amendment.216
The one exception would occur when a First Nation voluntarily
agreed to the extinguishment.
3. Sparrow v. The Queen Requires Judicial Review of Laws
Although the 1982 Constitution Act does not define Aboriginal
rights, or how they should be treated by the courts, Sparrow v. The
Queen 217 provides both a methodology and substantive answers to the
meaning of section 35(1). The defendant was charged under the Fish-
eries Act 218 for fishing with a driftnet longer than permitted by his
band's food fishing license. He admitted the facts but claimed an
Aboriginal right to fish under section 35(1) of the 1982 Constitution
Act.219 The court remanded the case for trial on the constitutional
issue, and provided criteria for reviewing legislation to assure that it
advances rather than hinders First Nation interests.22 °
The Sparrow Court said the Government has a fiduciary duty to
Aboriginal peoples.221 The role of the Government is "trust like,"
rather than adversarial. 2  Contemporary recognition and affirmation
of Aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this historic
relationship.
Important differences exist between the aboriginal title and rights of
First Nations in Canada and the United States. Many more outstand-
ing claims of Aboriginal title exist in Canada than in the United
States. Canada never created an equivalent to the United States
Indian Claims Commission. Aboriginal title and its proprietary inci-
216. P. HoGo, supra note 204, at 566.
217. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
218. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. F-14, §§ 34, 61 (1970).
219. The issue of commercial fishing as an Aboriginal right was not raised in the lower courts,
and thus was not discussed by the Supreme Court.
220. It is interesting to note that the Sparrow court cited and relied on Johnson v. M'Intosh,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), where the Supreme Court recognized Indian aboriginal title while
at the same time recognizing broad federal power over that title. [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 1103.
Johnson, and the two Cherokee opinions by Justice John Marshall, are frequently cited by
Canadian courts and scholars. These issues arose in the United States earlier than in Canada
because of the earlier settlement and conflict between Indians and non-Indians. This may also
explain in part why United States courts seldom cite Canadian cases in the Indian law field.
221. [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 1108.
222. Id
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dents are important, contemporary issues in Canada and are the basis
for numerous claims now being pursued through legal and political
avenues.
Justice Hall described Aboriginal title as "a right to occupy the
lands and to enjoy the fruits of the soil, the forest, and of the rivers and
streams." '223 In Sparrow, the Court, in interpreting the 1982 Constitu-
tion Act, found that the scope of the defendant's Aboriginal fishing
right should not be limited to mere subsistence, but could incorporate
evolving and contemporary224 uses as well.
IV. FEDERAL POWERS REGARDING NATIVE
AMERICANS AND NATIVE CANADIANS
A. The United States
1. The Plenary Power of Congress over Indians and the Indian
Commerce Clause
The United States Supreme Court has said that the federal govern-
ment has plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes.225 Early cases
attributed this power to the treaty clause of the Constitution, the prop-
erty clause, and the war power. In United States v. Kagama,226 the
Supreme Court attributed the power to enact the Major Crimes Act 227
to the trust relationship. The Court rejected the Indian commerce
clause as a basis228 because the clause only authorized Congress to
legislate about commerce, and crimes are not commerce. More recentjudicial opinions229 have rejected the trust relationship as a source of
congressional power and have attributed such power to the commerce
clause.
223. Calder v. Attorney-General, 1973 S.C.R. 313, 352 (Hall, J., dissenting).
224. [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 1093, 1099-1101.
225. Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977); Shoshone Tribe v.
United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937). See the definitive study by Newton, Federal Power Over
Indians: Its Sources. Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195, 199 (1984).
226. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
227. The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988) makes it a crime for Indians to commit
certain crimes on reservations, e.g., murder, manslaughter, rape, arson. In Kagama, 118 U.S. at
384-85, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act against the challenge that it was
beyond Congress' power.
228. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. That clause states: "[t]he Congress shall have Power To
... regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes" (emphasis added).
229. See, e.g., McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973) (the source of
federal authority over Indian matters has been the subject of some confusion, but it is now
generally recognized that the power derives from federal responsibility for regulating commerce
with Indian tribes and for treaty making).
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The Supreme Court has not always identified a specific constitu-
tional clause as the source of the federal government's power over
Indian tribes. In Johnson v. M'Intosh,2 30 the Court held that Indian
tribes have no power to convey title to lands to anyone other than the
federal government because "discovery" denied them that power. An
act of Congress is required to authorize a tribe to convey real property.
This includes water rights, which are considered real property.
31
2. All Indian Treaties Have Been at Least Partially Abrogated
Congress has asserted its authority over Indian tribes by disestab-
lishing some tribes, 32 by authorizing states to impose state jurisdiction
over tribes either with or without tribal consent,2 33 by authorizing
highways and reservoirs to be built on Indian lands,2" and by enacting
other legislation altering tribal sovereignty.2 35
The Supreme Court has approved Congress's unilateral authority to
abrogate Indian treaties2 36 and agreements, just as treaties with other
nations can be abrogated.23 7 If Indian property rights are damaged or
destroyed by such abrogations the Indians are entitled to compensa-
tion under the fifth amendment.2 38 If, however, the federal govern-
ment takes land or resources held under aboriginal title, which it
clearly has power to do, the Indians have no constitutional right to
compensation, 39 although in recent years Congress has usually made
a political judgment to award compensation. 24
230. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
231. See P. SLY, RESERVED WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENT MANUAL (1988); G.
WEATHERFORD, M. WALLACE, & L. STOREY, LEASING INDIAN WATER-CHOICES IN THE
COLORADO RIVER BASIN (1988).
232. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); DeCoteau v. District County
Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
233. This 1953 law, H.R. 1063, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., is commonly known as P.L. 280
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1988)).
234. Seneca Nation of Indians v. Brucker, 262 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 909 (1959).
235. See Newton, supra note 225.
236. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
237. Few treaties with foreign nations have been abrogated by Congress, whereas every
Indian treaty has been abrogated to some extent.
238. See United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 111 (1935).
239. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
240. The most important example of this policy is found in the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act of 1971, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628, where the federal government extinguished all
aboriginal claims to land and to hunting and fishing rights in Alaska and in return awarded the
Natives nearly a billion dollars, confirming title in newly-created Native Corporations to
approximately 44 million acres of land.
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Congress can enact special criminal laws applicable only to Indians
who commit crimes in Indian country.241 Enactment of these laws,
applying only to Indians and Indian tribes, does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution,242 because the
Court has said that they are based upon a political classification
(tribes), rather than a racial classification.
3. The Trust Relationship in the United States
The United States has a special relationship toward Indian tribes,
known as the "trust relationship." This includes general moral and
political obligations to deal fairly with Indians, 243 as well as legally
enforceable obligations. 2" The courts are often unclear which dimen-
sion of the trust relationship is at issue and the line between these two
concepts is often blurred.
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 245 is
the source of the trust relationship. Marshall characterized the tribes
as "domestic dependent nations" 2 " with a right of occupancy of the
land until the federal government chooses to extinguish their title. He
said "[m]eanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the
United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.
247
The trust obligation of the federal government constrains congres-
sional authority much less than it constrains executive authority. As
applied to Congress, the trust obligation imposes only a moral or polit-
ical obligation. No court has ever struck down congressional legisla-
tion concerning Indians on the basis of the trust relationship.24 On
the other hand, the trust relationship imposes justiciable duties on the
executive. The Court has held that where a treaty required the United
States to pay funds to tribal members, it was liable when it instead
paid the money to the tribal government which was known to be mis-
appropriating it. The government was "more than a mere contracting
party," it was to "be judged by the most exacting fiduciary stan-
241. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988); see United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641
(1977).
242. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974); Antelope, 430 U.S. 641; see Johnson &
Crystal, supra note 169.
243. Chambers, supra note 169.
244. United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell 11), 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
245. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
246. Id. at 17.
247. Id.
248. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Comment, Sparrow and the Lone
Wolf Native American Rights% Congress, and the Trust Obligation in the United States and
Canada, 66 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 1991).
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dards."249 In the 1980s, the Supreme Court defined the trust rela-
tionship further, holding that when the government assumes
comprehensive control over some aspect of Indian resources, such as
timber harvesting, a trust obligation arises:
[A] fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when the Government
assumes such elaborate control over forests and property belonging to
Indians. All of the necessary elements of a common-law trust are pres-
ent; a trustee (the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees), and
a trust corpus (Indian timber, lands, and funds).250
The Court then held the government liable for damages for the breach
of its fiduciary duties.2 5 1
Mitchell and other trust cases indicate that the Court will find an
enforceable trust responsibility as to the executive but only when a
statute or course of government conduct supports that relationship,
that is, no general trust relationship will be found arising out of the
common law. The trust relationship tends to reinforce the rules of
construction that doubtful statutes shall be construed in favor of the
Indians, and that treaties and agreements will be construed as the
Indians understood them.252
B. Canada
"The federal Parliament has taken the broad view that it may legis-
late for Indians on matters which otherwise lie outside its legislative
competence, and on which it could not legislate for non-Indians.
' 253
This view is based on interpretation of section.91(24) of the 1867 Con-
stitution Act.25
4
Can Parliament, by legislation, abrogate treaties with Indians?
Pentney writes that "[i]n practice... virtually all of the important
terminations of treaty obligations have been involuntary, in the form
of legislative enactments. ' 255 The termination of treaty rights has usu-
ally arisen in connection with hunting and fishing rights. The leading
case in Regina v. Sikyea,256 which upheld the Migratory Birds Con-
249. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942).
250. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983).
251. Id. at 228.
252. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905).
253. P. HoGG, supra note 204, at 553. Hogg writes that the most conspicuous examples of
this super legislative authority are the provisions of the Indian Act that govern'succession to the
property of deceased Indians. There are also provisions for administration of the property of the
mentally ill and infants. Id
254. CAN. REv. STAT. app. II, No. 44 (1985).
255. Pentney, supra note 168, at 46.
256. R. v. Sikyea, 46 W.W.R. 65, 74-75 (N.W. 1964), aff'd, 1984 S.C.R. 642.
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vention between Great Britain, on behalf of Canada, and the United
States and Mexico, despite the fact that it substantially restricted
treaty hunting rights. This case established that federal law could
supersede treaty rights, and has been followed in later cases.2"'
The Canadian Bill of Rights guarantees equality before the law and
specifically prohibits discrimination by reason of race. Yet section
91(24) of the 1867 Constitution Act establishes a basis for special laws
for Indians and reserves. In fact, as Hogg says:
such laws are the sole reason for s. 91(24). Indeed, legislation enacted in
relation to "Indians"... must normally be confined to Indians, that is
to say, it must employ a racial classification in order to be constitutional.
Legislation in relation to "lands reserved for the Indians". . . need not
necessarily employ a racial classification.2 5
8
In the United States, congressional legislation dealing with Indians
does not violate the equal protection clause because, the Court says, it
refers to a political classification-Indian tribes-and not to Indians as
a racial group.259 Such legislation is also sustained by the Indian com-
merce clause of the Constitution.2 °
1. The Indian Act Stifles Tribal Governments
Under the Indian Act in Canada, traditional Indian governments
were replaced by band councils that function as agents of the federal
government, exercising a limited range of delegated powers under
close federal supervision.
The basic Canadian law dealing with Aboriginals is the Indian Act,
originally passed in 1876.261 It determines who is a status26 2 Indian in
Canada by enumerating which bands are recognized or chartered, 263
and provides for a registration system for individuals of those bands.
The Act specifically excludes Metis264 and Indians who are
257. See Pentney, The Rights of the Aboriginal People of Canada and the Constitution Act,
1982-Part L" The Interpretive Prism of Section 25, 22 U. BRrr. COLUM. L. REV. 21, 48 (1988).
258. P. HOGG, supra note 204, at 555.
259. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
260. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
261. See CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 43 (1886). Although amended several times, this Act
remained nearly the same until significant revisions occurred in 1951. The 1951 edition has been
amended, but is substantially the same at present. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 32 (1985).
262. "Status" Indian in the Canadian literature means an Indian who is registered or who is
entitled to be registered under section 2(I) of the Indian Act. Sometimes they are referred to as
"treaty" Indians where their land is covered by a treaty. J. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 7.
263. See J. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 12.
264. Metis are commonly thought to be persons of mixed white and Indian blood. See, e.g.,
Metis Betterment Act, ALTA. REV. STAT. ch. 233 (1970) amended by ch. 26, 1982 Alta. Stat.
251. Woodward suggests the definition should include facts or circumstances, such as "whether
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enfranchised, that is, fully assimilated into Canadian majority soci-
ety.2 65 Status Indians and Inuit are generally accorded the same rights
in terms of Aboriginal title and treaty agreements.266
The 1982 Constitution Act recognizes and affirms existing Aborigi-
nal and treaty rights, which were preserved in the Royal Proclamation
of 1763.267 No new legislation is necessary to create or delegate those
rights. A special committee to the House of Commons recommended
in 1983 that legislation be enacted to occupy all areas of competence
necessary to permit First Nations to govern themselves and to ensure
that provincial laws would not apply on Indian lands except by agree-
ment of the Band government.2 68 No such legislation has yet been
enacted and there is little chance that such enactment will soon occur.
2. The Trust Relationship in Canada
In Canada, the law concerning trust obligations and Indians is con-
siderably less developed than in the United States. It has largely blos-
somed since the 1982 Constitution Act, and partly because of that
Act. Nonetheless Canadian and United States laws are similar.
Some form of fiduciary relationship has been recognized in Canada
from early times. Woodward notes that the fiduciary relationship was
first enunciated in the Royal Proclamation of 1763,269 but the case
that primarily developed the relationship was Guerin v. The Queen.270
The trust relationships of the United States and Canadian govern-
ments towards Indians are generally parallel. Canadian courts have
tended to adopt rules similar to those supplied by courts in the United
States, largely because the issues have frequently arisen and been
decided earlier in the United States. Bartlett says:
The history of the Aboriginal peoples and of their relationship to gov-
ernments in the United States closely parallels circumstances in Canada.
Not surprisingly, Canadian courts have paid considerable regard to
United States jurisprudence. The Supreme Court of Canada has accen-
a person's ancestors received 'scrip,' or a grant of land under the Manitoba Act, 1870... [or]
under any of the Dominion Lands Acts, or were entitled to such a grant." J. WOODWARD, supra
note 1, at 54-55.
265. Some enfranchised Indians may get their status back under 1985 revisions to the Indian
Act. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 1-5, § 6(l)(e) (1985); see also J. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 22-23.
266. The Metis, despite initial agreements reserving a land base to them, were later excluded
from treaty activity as a group, their claims being settled through individual payments of land or
scrip. G. BROWN & P. MAGUntE, supra note 110, at 28, 31-35.
267. INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT, supra note 206, at 44.
268. Id. at 59.
269. . WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 63.
270. [1984] 2 S.CR. 335.
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tuated this practice in recent years. When Guerin was appealed to the
Supreme Court of Canada, all parties relied on United States
jurisprudence.27 1
The trust obligation in Canadian law was given more power in
Guerin v. The Queen, 2 72 where the Court held that the federal govern-
ment must deal in good faith, and keep its word, when managing tribal
property held in trust. "The Musqueam Band surrendered reserve
lands to the Crown for lease to a golf club. The terms of the lease
actually obtained by the Crown were much less favorable than those
approved by the Band at the surrender meeting.12 73 The Court found
that when the Crown took the land in order to lease it, a fiduciary
relationship was created in its place: "[t]he sui generis nature of Indian
title and the historic powers and responsibility assumed by the Crown
constituted the source of such a fiduciary obligation. '274 The property
had appreciated since the breach of trust. The court affirmed damages
of ten million dollars, quoting an Australian opinion on common law
principles concerning damages in breach of trust: "a defaulting trustee
must make good the loss by restoring to the estate the assets of which
he deprived it notwithstanding that market values may have increased
in the meantime.
2 75
In 1990, however, in Sparrow v. The Queen,2 76 the Canadian
Supreme Court tied the trust relationship together with the honor of
the Crown. The Sparrow Court opined that the "honour of the
Crown" is at stake when interpreting documents involving First
Nations. In addition, "the special trust relationship and the responsi-
bility of the government vis-a-vis Aboriginal people must be the first
consideration in determining whether the legislation or action in ques-
tion can be justified. 2 77
The Court said that legislation affecting the exercise of Aboriginal
rights is valid only if it meets the test for "justifying" an interference
with a right "recognized and affirmed" under section 35(1). The
Court then set forth criteria to determine if legislation is "justified,"
one of which is the extent of legislative or regulatory impact on an
Aboriginal right.
271. R. BARTLETT, A HOMELAND, supra note 110, at 190 (footnote omitted).
272. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335.
273. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1108 (discussing Guerin, [1984] 2 S.C.R. at
345-48).
274. Id. (discussing Guerin, [1984] 2 S.C.R. at 348-50, 376, 382).
275. Guerin, [1984] 2 S.C.R. at 361 (quoting Re Dawson; Union Fidelity Trustee Co. v.
Perpetual Trustee Co., 84 N.S.W.W.N. 399, 404-06 (1966)).
276. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
277. Id. at 1079.
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[Flederal power must be reconciled with federal duty and the best way
to achieve that reconcliation is to demand the justification of any gov-
ernment regulation that infringes upon or denies aboriginal rights. Such
scrutiny is in keeping with... the concept of holding the Crown to a
high standard of honourable dealing.2 78
This level of judicial review provides "a measure of control over gov-
ernment conduct and a strong check on legislative power."279
The Court stated that section 35(1) requires judicial review of legis-
lation. The broad legislative power over Indians provided in the 1867
Constitution Act is now modified by the judicial review power
imposed by section 35(1). The government bears the burden ofjustify-
ing legislation2 °0 that has a negative effect on any Aboriginal right pro-
tected under section 35(1).281 The first question a court should ask is
whether the legislation interferes with an Aboriginal right. If so, it
represents a prima facie infringement of section 35(1). To decide
whether a prima facie case is established, the court must determine
whether the limitation is unreasonable.28 2 Second, the court must
determine whether the regulation imposes undue hardship. Third, the
court must determine whether the regulation denies holders of their
preferred means of exercising that right.28 3
At this point, analysis moves to the issue of justification.284 Is there
a valid legislative objective? If the objective is conserving and manag-
ing a natural resource, it will probably be valid.285 Also valid would
be objectives purporting to prevent the exercise of section 35(1) rights
that would cause harm to the general populace, or to Aboriginal peo-
ples themselves.286
If a valid legislation objective is found, the analysis proceeds to the
second part of the justification issue, considering whether the "honour
of the Crown" has been upheld.28 7 Food fishing, including fish for
ceremonial and social occasions, is to be given priority over the inter-
278. Id at 1109.
279. Id at 1110.
280. See the comparison of the Sparrow criteria with United States equal protection analysis,
infra notes 298-305 and accompanying text.
281. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 1110.
282. Id at 1112.
283. For example, in Sparrow the test involved asking whether either the purpose or the effect
of the restriction on net length unnecessarily infringed the interests protected by the fishing right.
Were the Musqueam forced to spend undue time and money per fish with a shorter net?
284. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 1113.
285. Id. at 1113-14.
286. The court rejected the test, whether the legislation or regulation is in the "public
interest" as too vague. Id at 1113.
287. Id at 1114.
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ests of other user groups.28 8 Additional questions must be addressed,
such as whether there has been the least infringement possible,
whether fair compensation is available if an expropriation is involved,
and whether the Aboriginal group has been consulted with respect to
the conservation measures 289
3. Does the Sparrow Concept Fit the United States?
The American public has difficulty believing... [that] injustice con-
tinues to be inflicted upon Indian people because Americans assume that
the sympathy or tolerance they feel toward Indians is somehow "felt" or
transferred to the government policy that deals with Indians. This is not
the case.29 °
Two comparisons come to mind when considering Sparrow and
United States Indian law. The first involves the Pacific Northwest
Indian fishing rights dispute in which the courts were asked to inter-
pret treaties that reserved to the tribes the right to fish off-reservation
at their usual and accustomed fishing sites "in common with the citi-
zens of the territory." '2 9 1 In 1968, the United States Supreme Court
held that under this treaty language, the state may regulate Indians
"in the interest of conservation, provided the regulation meets appro-
priate standards and does not discriminate against the Indians. 2 92
Later, in 1974, a federal court found that state regulations failed to
meet the conservation standard or were discriminatory, and enjoined
their implementation.2 93 Conservation, the court said:
is limited to those measures which are reasonable and necessary to the
perpetuation of a particular run or species of fish. In this context...
"reasonable" means that a specifically identified conservation measure is
appropriate to its purposes; and "necessary" means that such purpose in
addition to being reasonable must be essential to conservation. 294
The state has the burden of proving the regulation is reasonable and
necessary. To do so, the state must show that the conservation pur-
pose cannot first be satisfied by restricting non-Indian fishing. The
288. Id. at 1101, 1116.
289. Id. at 1119.
290. L. Silko (Laguna Pueblo author), Foreword to Now THAT THE BUFFALO'S GONE (A.
Josephy, Jr. ed. 1982).
291. Treaty of Point Elliott, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927; Treaty of Point No Point, Jan. 26,
1855, 12 Stat. 933; Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132.
292. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968).
293. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1975).
294. Id. at 342.
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court said: "[i]f alternative means and methods of... conservation
regulation are available, the state cannot lawfully restrict the exercise
of off reservation treaty right fishing, even if the only alternatives are
restriction of fishing by non-treaty fishermen, either commercially or
otherwise, to the full extent necessary for conservation of fish."29
Two observations are pertinent. First, the United States rules
evolved out of a treaty interpretation case, whereas the Sparrow rule
evolved from an Aboriginal rights case. Secondly, the United States
Supreme Court has ruled that Indians may fish commercially, because
they bartered fish from prehistoric times.2 96 The Sparrow Court
declined to decide this issue because it was not raised in the lower
courts.
297
A second analogy may be drawn between Canadian and United
States law. The Sparrow rule reminds one of the equal protection anal-
ysis of the United States Supreme Court.2 98 The fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the federal Constitution require the federal and state
governments respectively to provide equal protection to all individu-
als. The concept governs governmental actions which classify individ-
uals for different benefits or burdens under the law. It requires that
persons similarly situated should be treated alike.2 99 It guarantees
that legislative classifications will not be based on impermissible crite-
ria or arbitrarily used to burden a group of individuals." ° A statutory
classification that is based on economics will be tested by the milder
"rational basis" standard: the question is whether it is conceivable that
the classification bears a rational relationship to an end of government
that is not prohibited by the Constitution. Nearly all legislation tested
by this standard is sustained.
On the other hand a statutory classification that affects a fundamen-
tal right such as voting,3" or the right to travel,30 2 or a classification
295. Id
296. Id at 332-33.
297. PR v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.PR 1075, 1101.
298. When a status infringes on a fundamental right, such as the right to vote or travel, or if
the statute is based on a suspect classification such as race or national origin, the courts apply
"strict scrutiny" to the legislation. Under this -often fatal test the classification must be
"necessary" to achieve a "compelling governmental interest" for the law to stand. See San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
299. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 344
(1949).
300. J. NOWAK, R. RoTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 523 (3d ed. 1986).
301. Harper, 383 U.S. 663.
302. Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618.
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that is based on race or national origin, receives "strict scrutiny"3 3 by
the courts. Under this test a court strikes down the legislation unless
it is "necessary" to achieve a "compelling" governmental interest.
Almost all legislation tested by this standard fails.3 1
Nowak, Rotunda and Young have concisely described the Supreme
Court's strict scrutiny test:
The strict scrutiny test means that the justices will not defer to the
decision of the other branches of government but will instead indepen-
dently determine the degree of relationship which the classification bears
to a constitutionally compelling end. The Court will not accept every
permissible government purpose as sufficient to support a classification
under this test, but will instead require the government to show that it is
pursuing a "compelling" or "overriding" end-one whose value is so
great that it justifies the limitation of fundamental constitutional values.
Even if the government can demonstrate such an end, the Court will
not uphold the classification unless the justices have independently
reached the conclusion that the classification is necessary to promote
that compelling interest. Although absolute necessity might not be
required, the justices will require the government to show a close rela-
tionship between the classification and promotion of a compelling or
overriding interest. If the justices are of the opinion that the classifica-
tion need not be employed to achieve such an end, the law will be held
to violate the equal protection guarantee.30 5
Returning to the field of Indian law, the Supreme Court held in
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,306 that Congress is the sole arbiter of its own
good faith and of the question whether legislation advances or dam-
ages Indian interests. No judicial review applying strict scrutiny or
any other standard constrains Congress.30 7 In Canada the Sparrow
decision holds differently. If the good faith or trust responsibility of
303. Strict scrutiny has been called "strict in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, The
Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
304. Gunther, supra note 303, at 1.
305. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 300, at 530.
306. 187 U.S. 553, 567-68 (1903).
307. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). This case called for
judicial review of treaty dealings with the Sioux tribe. The case is unique in that Congress passed
a special statute asking the courts to make such a review. Act. of Mar. 13, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
243, 92 Stat. 153 (1978). Lone Wolf 187 U.S. 553 (1903) still stands as the law absent such
special legislative authority. See also Comment, supra note 248.
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Parliament is in question, the court will give the law careful
"scrutiny. ' 30 8
Although Sparrow dealt with an Aboriginal fishing right, the lan-
guage used by the Court to describe the fiduciary duty of the govern-
ment seems to reach more broadly, as where the Court says "the
Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with
respect to aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the govern-
ment and aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contem-
porary recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights must be defined
in light of this historic relationship. ' '3 1 This broad language suggests
that the trust relationship protects not only Aboriginal title and fishing
rights, but also, perhaps, the right to self-government.
The Sparrow doctrine of judicial review of Indian legislation is pred-
icated partly on the 1982 Constitution Act. Given the general terms
of that Act, however, the Sparrow interpretation is significantly attrib-
utable to the Canadian Supreme Court's embracement of a general
trust obligation. The United States Supreme Court took a different
turn in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, ruling that while congressional legisla-
tion about Indians should demonstrate "perfect good faith," no judi-
cial review of that issue was justified. 311 United States v. Sioux Nation
of Indians31 I reflects a judicial tempering of this view and a possible
inclination to re-examine the Lone Wolf rule. In that re-examination
United States courts could benefit from a study of the Canadian juris-
prudence, specifically Sparrow v. The Queen.
V. STATE AND PROVINCIAL POWER OVER INDIANS
A. United States
In the United States, states historically had no judicial or legislative
power over Indian country,312 because the tribes were semi-sovereign
308. This exact term is used twice in Sparrow. 'The extent of legislative or regulatory impact
on an existing aboriginal right may be scrutinized so as to ensure recognition and affirmation" of
the Aboriginal right R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1110.
'[R]ecognition and affirmation' incorporate the fiduciary relationship referred to earlier and
so import some restraint on the exercise of sovereign power.... [Flederal power must be
reconciled with federal duty and the best way to achieve that reconciliation is to demand the
justification of any government regulation that infringes upon or denies aboriginal rights.
Such scrutiny is in keeping with... a high standard of honourable dealing with respect to
the aboriginal peoples of Canada ....
Id. at 1109.
309. Id at 1108.
310. 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
311. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
312. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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under federal protection. Only the federal government had authority
to negotiate with the tribes. The Court blurred this "bright line" doc-
trine slightly in 1882 when it decided than an offense committed by a
non-Indian against a non-Indian on a reservation fell under the juris-
diction of state courts and state criminal codes.31 3
Congress further eroded tribal immunity from state law in 1953
when it enacted P.L. 280, empowering forty-five states to make a lim-
ited extension of state jurisdiction onto Indian reservations with or
without Indian consent.314 Many states enacted laws asserting juris-
diction over reservations, sometimes with Indian consent and some-
times without. 315 The courts have limited P.L. 280,316 construing it to
apply only to state laws of general application such as state criminal
laws.317 States cannot impose state taxes, or state or local regulatory
laws, such as zoning, on reservations.318 P.L. 280 explicitly denied
states jurisdiction over Indian hunting, fishing, and water rights.319
The United States Supreme Court has further eroded Indian immu-
nity from state law by changing its analytical approach to the issue of
state jurisdiction in Indian country. In 1973, the Court decided that
immunity from state law no longer depends on "sovereignty," but now
depends on "preemption" analysis.32 ° Preemption analysis asks
whether the federal government has so fully occupied the field of law
that there is no room left for state action. When sovereignty was the
key issue, the reservation boundary was quite impervious to state law,
except when Congress explicitly breached it by clear legislation such
as P.L. 280, or termination legislation. Under preemption analysis,
however, the court considers each case on its own facts321 in deciding
whether the federal government has so fully occupied the field that no
room is left for state action. In general, the courts easily find preemp-
tion where the controversy is among Indians, or between an Indian
and a tribe.322 Preemption is difficult to find if the controversy is
313. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
314. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 87 Stat. 588-90 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1151, 1162, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1360 (1988)).
315. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (1989) (amended 1963).
316. E.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
317. Eg., Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
318. Id.
319. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1988).
320. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
321. See Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982); White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona State
Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
322. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 150-51.
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among non-Indians.323 Uncertainty occurs when the controversy is
between a non-Indian and an Indian.324 In the meantime, "sover-
eignty" has been relegated to "backdrop" status.32
5
Where an Indian and a non-Indian are involved, state laws will
apply on the reservation even though Congress has never so legislated
if the tribal interest is modest and the state interest great.326 State and
local law have been held to apply to zoning of non-Indian land on a
checkerboarded part of a reservation where approximately 50% of the
land is owned by non-Indians.3 27 Conversely, a few members of the
Court said state zoning laws do not apply on a "closed" portion of the
reservation where more than 90% of the land was tribally owned.328
State law applied to non-Indians fishing on non-Indian lands on a res-
ervation where the tribe was not seriously affected by the fishing and
failed to show historic, aboriginal reliance on fish as a source of
food.329 State jurisdiction failed when a state imposed taxes on the
non-Indian builder of a school on a reservation because federal policy
and money encouraged the educational program for Indian chil-
dren.330 In yet another case, the state was barred from imposing a
"transactions privilege tax" on a non-Indian machinery seller who
made a one-time-only tractor sale on the reservation to a member of
the tribe.331 The Court said the non-Indian seller was a "trader" and
was comprehensively regulated by the federal Indian Trader Stat-
utes. 332 A state also failed in its attempt to impose taxes on a non-
Indian motor carrier that hauled logs on the reservation from an
Indian logging operation.3 3 The logs were hauled over BIA or tribal
roads, and the logging operation was strongly encouraged and partly
financed by the federal government, thus preempting state jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the state is not preempted from controlling water
distribution to non-Indian landowners on the reservation where the
323. In no case has a court found preemption where two non-Indians are involved.
324. See Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144; Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155-56 (1980).
325. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
326. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994
(1989).
327. Id at 3009.
328. Id at 3015.
329. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
330. Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
331. Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
332. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 261-264 (1988).
333. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
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water is surplus to the Indians' needs, and the source river starts above
the reservation and flows on below it.334
Federal law controls the question of Indians' rights to water under
the Winters doctrine. Under the 1952 McCarran Amendment, 335
however, state courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate Indian water
rights and determine the amount of water to which the Indians are
entitled.33 6 State courts must still apply federal law in these proceed-
ings, and the Indians, or the United States on their behalf, can petition
the United States Supreme Court for review if they feel the state court
misconstrued or misapplied federal law. Several such state court adju-
dications have now been completed in the western United States. 337
Others are still pending in the courts.338
B. Canada
Canada has no foundation court decision similar to the Worcester v.
Georgia 339 holding that state law does not apply on an Indian reserva-
tion. In Canada, detailed federal laws control much of Aboriginal life.
In addition, federal power over Aboriginals has been transferred to the
provinces through a number of legislative enactments. Perhaps the
most important delegation of federal legislative power over First
Nations is found in a 1951 amendment to the Indian Act.3 ° Section
88 permits extension of provincial laws of general applicability over
Indians, subject to the terms of treaties and federal laws.34' This stat-
ute has spawned voluminous litigation, particularly with regard to off-
reserve hunting and fishing rights. The extent to which section 88 per-
334. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984). Where the source river was
entirely contained on the reservation, the court held that state law did not apply to the non-
Indian landowner in his use of surplus water. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d
42 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
335. Act of July 10, 1952, ch. 208(a)-(c), 66 Stat. 560 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1988)).
336. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); see also
United States v. District Court, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
The term "adjudication" means to bring into one lawsuit everyone who claims a water right
within a given river basin or sub-basin so that all water rights are determined at one time. It does
not allow suits against the United States for determination of Indian water rights by a single, or
even several plaintiffs. Every claimant must be included.
337. Two such agreements are representative: the Big Horn River System, Wyoming, see In
re Big Horn, 750 P.2d 681 (Wyo. 1988), and the Fort Peck, Montana Compact, see MONT. CODE
ANN. § 85-20-201 (1990).
338. P. SLY, supra note 231; G. WEATHERFORD, M. WALLACE & L. STOREY, supra note 231.
339. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
340. The Indian Act, ch. 29, 1951 Can. Stat. 131, 161.
341. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 1-5, § 88 (1985). This power is presumably now subject also to the
constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal and treaty rights under the Constitution Act, 1982,
CAN. RE. STAT. app. II, No. 44, § 35(1) (1985).
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mits application of provincial laws to Indian lands and resources is
unsettled. 42 Provincial laws generally apply to Indians on as well as
off reserves.343 This is true of wildlife,344 environmental, and other
laws. This rule, however, is subject to several exceptions. Provincial
laws do not apply to First Nations where Aboriginal rights are pro-
tected by section 35(1) of the 1982 Constitution Act, are expressed in a
treaty, or appear in a federal statute such as the Indian Act.3 45 Fur-
ther, provincial laws may not single out Indians for special adverse
treatment or affect their "Indianness. ' '3 6 Sanders describes "Indian-
ness" as covering the "political, social and economic life of the com-
munity. ' 347 Woodward says it covers "laws which affect the essential
characteristics of a people as Indian people," and notes that these
"essential characteristics have not yet been elaborated on by the
Courts. ' 34 1 In Derrickson v. Derrickson, the Court ruled that provin-
cial laws may not interfere with First Nation possessory rights to
reserve land, which are exclusively a federal matter.349 In Surrey v.
Peace Arch Enterprises,350 the Court found that provincial zoning laws
cannot apply on reserve lands. Thus, a municipality could not zone
reserve lands even within municipal boundaries. In the United States,
the prevailing doctrine is that state laws do not apply in Indian coun-
try unless Congress says so, 35 1 or when the issue is not central to
Indian life.352 In Canada, the opposite theory prevails. Provincial law
342. Derrickson v. Derrickson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285, 297-99. Questions of title and rights of
possession concerning reserve lands are exclusively within Parliament's federal authority. Id at
293, 296. "It is far from settled that s. 88 contemplates referential incorporation [of provincial
laws] with respect to lands reserved for Indians." Id at 297.
343. 'he basic principle is that provincial laws apply [to Indians and Indian lands] unless
excluded by one of these rules." J. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 120., For "these rules," see
infra notes 345-46 and accompanying text.
344. Dick v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309.
345. Sanders delineates two basic principles that have emerged from the cases: (1) provincial
laws apply to Indians if they do not discriminate against Indians and are not in conflict with
federal laws; and (2) provincial laws apply to Indian reserve lands if they do not directly affect
the use of those lands, do not discriminate against Indians, and do not conflict with federal law.
Sanders, The Application of Provincial Laws, in ABOuGINAL PEOPLES AND THE LAW, supra
note 110, at 452.
346. Sanders, Hunting Rights--Provincial Laws--Application on Indian Reservey, 38 SAsK. L.
REV. 234, 242 (1974).
347. Id (citing Dick v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309, 323).
348. J. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 121.
349. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285, 296.
350. 74 W.W.R. 380, 383 (B.C. 1970).
351. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1988) (authorizing state to
impose state jurisdiction on reservations).
352. For example, where a non-Indian commits a crime against a non-Indian, or where
zoning applies mostly to non-Indians and non-Indian-owned lands.
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applies to Indian reserves except when the provincial law is contrary
to section 35(1) of the 1982 Constitution Act, contrary to a treaty, or
contrary to federal law.353 Significantly, the Allotment Act of 1887 in
the United States, which created checkerboard ownership on many
reservations, has no parallel in Canada. In the United States, this
checkerboarding is one reason that state law has been allowed to
intrude onto reservations. In Canada, of course, provincial law applies
to reserves regardless of land ownership.
VI. INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT
The act establishing the [Cherokee] Standing Committee... provided
for Warriors in National Council Assembled. The committee was to
consist of thirteen members each serving two year terms.... The resolu-
tion further provided that "affairs of the Nation shall be committed to
the care of the standing comiittee... but acts of this body shall not be
binding in our common property on the Nation without unanimous con-
sent of the members and Chiefs of the Council.354
A. The United States
In the United States, tribes have all the powers of self-government
except as those powers have been changed by clear action of Congress,
or lost by necessary implication arising from their dependent status.355
Over the years, these sovereign powers have gradually but consistently
diminished. Early decisions held that tribes, because of their depen-
dent status, lost their power to enter into treaties or agreements with
other nations. 356 Also, due to the guardian-ward relationship, tribes
lost their capacity to convey title to their real property, including
water rights, except with the consent of the United States.3 57 In 1881,
the Supreme Court held that a crime committed by one non-Indian
against another non-Indian was to be tried in state court, under state
353. Under P.L. 280, the tribes may have retained concurrent jurisdiction with the state, so
the tribes did not lose any jurisdiction. State jurisdiction was merely added and made concurrent
with tribal jurisdiction. This issue is now being tested in Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Reservation v. Superior Court, No. 89-35829 (9th Cir. filed Nov. 30, 1989).
354. R. STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS-CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT 62
(1975).
355. "The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have
occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and non-members of the tribe
....." Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (emphasis in original) (citing United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)).
356. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
357. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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law.3" 8 Tribal courts had no jurisdiction. In 1886, the Court held that
Congress had power to enact the Major Crimes Act,3" 9 applicable to
Indians in Indian Country, without necessarily obtaining the consent
of the Indians.3 6
Government policy seriously eroded traditional Indian governance
in the late 1800s by breaking up reservations under the 1887 Dawes
Act3 61 and by administrative policies designed to individualize Indians
and discourage their communal lifestyle.362 Congress intended gradu-
ally to terminate the reservations and thus saw no need to plan the
best form of tribal governments. The tribes would simply disap-
pear.3 63 The IRA sanctioned tribal governments, but operated to pro-
mote governments with limited powers and non-Indian forms and
procedures. In 1953, Congress enacted P.L. 280 authorizing forty-five
states to impose their jurisdiction over Indian reservations either with
or without Indian consent. 3 " In 1968, the Indian Civil Rights Act
(ICRA)361 changed the law to require Indian consent to state jurisdic-
tion. The ICRA, however, also applied a variation of the Bill of
Rights to Indian tribal courts and governments, and limited tribal
court criminal jurisdiction to fines of $500 and imprisonment of six
months.366
Modem court decisions have contributed to the erosion of tribal
government. In 1978, the Supreme Court held that tribal courts did
not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians committing crimes
against the tribal code.36 7 In 1990, the Supreme Court held that tribal
courts lack jurisdiction over non-member Indians.368 In 1973, the
Supreme Court adopted preemption as the formula for analyzing
358. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
359. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
360. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). The courts still have not decided
whether the Major Crimes Act eliminated tribal court jurisdiction over the same crimes. Tribal
and federal jurisdiction are probably concurrent.
361. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
362. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 129-30.
363. Id. at 139.
364. Many states imposed jurisdiction on tribes, sometimes with, and sometimes without
their consent. See Goldberg, supra note 87.
365. Title II, §§ 201-203, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1303, 1321-1322 (1988)).
366. Id § 202. The penalties were increased in 1986 to $5,000 and one year of confinement.
25 U.S.C. § 1302(7).
367. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
368. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990). But see Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, § 8077, Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1892 (1990) (legislatively reversing the Duro holding
for one year).
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whether state laws applied on the reservation. 369 In practice, this
meant that state laws apply in many situations where they would ear-
lier have been excluded, such as where a county zones property owned
by a non-Indian on a checkerboarded part of the reservation.37 ° Thus,
the sovereignty and self-governing powers of Indian tribes have gradu-
ally been eroded in these multiple and diverse ways. Tribal govern-
mental powers nonetheless are still substantial.
[I]n addition to the power to punish tribal offenders, the Indian tribes
retain their inherent power to determine tribal membership, to regulate
domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance
for members .... But exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary
to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is incon-
sistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive
without express Congressional delegation.
Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms
of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-
Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual rela-
tionships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements.... A tribe may also retain
inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indi-
ans on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or
has direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe.371
Several cases have been decided by the federal courts since Montana
and illustrate how the lower federal courts apply the Montana test.372
The Supreme Court itself addressed the question of tribal zoning
369. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
370. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989).
371. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564, 565-66 (1981).
372. In Segundo v. City of Rancho Mirage, 813 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1987), the court held that
a municipal rent control ordinance could not be applied to a mobile home park operated by non-
Indians on an Indian-owned allotment land on the Agua Caliente Reservation in California.
Both tribal trust land and allotment land fall under the exclusive regulatory authority of the
tribe. In Knight v. Shoshone & Arapaho Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982), the court
ruled that the tribe could zone non-Indian land on the reservation and prevent it from being
subdivided by private developers. This met the "police power" aspect of the Montana test in that
the development would have a direct effect on the health and welfare of the tribe. The county
had no zoning ordinance for the area in question. The fact that the code applied to and affected
non-Indians who could not participate in tribal government was immaterial.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982), held that the Quinault Indians' tribal health and safety regulations
applied to non-Indian owners of a grocery store within the reservation. The facts satisfied both
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power over non-Indian land on the reservation in Brendale,37 holding
in a highly fractured opinion that the tribe had exclusive zoning power
over the "closed" part of the ,Yakima reservation, predominantly
Indian land and population, while the tribe and county shared zoning
power over the "open" part of the reservation, predominantly non-
Indian occupied and owned. The county zoned non-Indian-owned
lands, while the tribe zoned trust and tribally-owned lands within the
"open" area.
One of the most comprehensive legislative intrusions in Indian gov-
ernance occurred in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA). 7
This Act encouraged renewal of tribal governments, but in a different
form. The Act authorized tribes to draw up constitutions for approval
of the Secretary of the Interior. When a constitution was approved it
gave the tribe status of an IRA tribe with certain legislative powers
and protections. These constitutions created governments with a tri-
bal chairperson, and tribal councils elected by the tribal membership.
In spite of the fact that the tribes had federally approved constitu-
tions, they operated on the basis of inherent sovereignty.175 Federal
policy encouraged tribal courts to grow and become more proficient.
Acceptance of the IRA form of government was voluntary. Each tribe
the consensual commercial relationship aspect of the Montana test, and represented conduct that
directly threatened tribal health and welfare, which met the second aspect of the Montana test.
The federal district court in Lummi Indian Tribe v. Hallauer, 9 Ind. L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law
Training Program) 3025 (W.D. Wash. 1982), approved a tribe's requirement that non-Indians
hook up to the tribal sewer system. The health and welfare of the reservation residents was
clearly involved there.
In Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 977 (1982), the Ninth Circuit held that the Flathead Tribe could regulate the riparian rights
of non-Indian landowners on the reservation. The non-Indians owned land fronting on a lake,
the bed of which was part of the reservation. The exercise" of these riparian rights directly
affected the health and welfare of the tribes. In a recent district court case in California,
Pinoleville Indian Community v. Mendocino County, 685 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. Cal. 1988), the
court upheld an injunction against an asphalt and cement plant on non-Indian owned land within
the boundaries of the rancheria (a reservation-like holding in California). The court found that
the plant would affect the health and welfare of the tribe.
In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981), the court held that the tribe could regulate surplus water use on non-Indian-owned land
on the reservation where the source stream started and died within the boundaries of the
reservation. In a subsequent case, United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d-1358 (9th Cir. 1984), the
court ruled that the tribe could not regulate non-Indian water use on fee land where the source
river started above the reservation and flowed on beyond it downstream. The court recognized
the tribe's interest in regulation but concluded the state's interest was greater than in Walton
because only a small portion of the source river was located on the reservation.
373. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989).
374. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-492 (1988).
375. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 149, 232, 239.
703
Washington Law Review
voluntarily decided whether to accept this form of government.376
Over two-thirds of the nation's tribes became IRA tribes.37 7 Over the
years, however, nearly all tribes (except for the theocratic Pueblos of
New Mexico) adopted constitutions and the chairperson/council form
of government similar to the IRA tribes.3 78
1. Federal Delegation of Environmental Control to Indian Tribes
What happens to the Earth happens to the children of the Earth.
Man has not woven the web of life. He is but one thread. Whatever he
does to the web, he does to himself.3 7 9
In the United States, Congress and the courts have affirmed tribal
governmental power by delegating authority to implement federal
environmental laws to the tribes, and by enabling tribes to receive fed-
eral grants toward this goal in the same way as states. In Canada, no
similar legislative delegations have occurred.38 °
Seven major federal environmental statutes authorize delegation of
authority to Indian tribes: the Clean Water Act (CWA),3 8' the Clean
Air Act (CAA),382 the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA),383 the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA),384 the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenti-
cide Act (FIFRA),385 the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 386 and the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (RCRA)3 87 Only a few tribes have received these delegations,
primarily because of the lack of federal funds to hire the essential
experts.
376. 25 U.S.C. § 478 (1988).
377. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 150 n.48.
378. F. PRUCHA, supra note 14, at 390.
379. Attributed to Chief Seattle (Duwamish Indian Tribe, 1855). See How CAN ONE SELL
THE AIR? A MANIFESTO OF AN INDIAN CHIEF (1984).
380. Only a few tribes in the United States have taken advantage of this opportunity to
manage their water quality environment. Most show a relative disinterest, or lack of capacity to
manage water quality effectively.
381. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
382. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
383. 42 U.S.C. § 300f-300j (1988).
384. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). The statute was amended by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613
(codified in scattered sections of Titles 10, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), and Pub. L. No. 99-563, 100
Stat. 3177 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9671-9675).
385. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
386. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988).
387. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988).
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The CWA is illustrative of these delegations. Enacted in 1972, it
gave the federal government, rather than the state governments, pri-
mary authority to prevent, reduce, or eliminate pollution in the
nation's waters. A national waste discharge permit system was estab-
lished that could be delegated to the states for implementation."' The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has authority to approve
and delegate, or disapprove and decline to delegate, state programs.389
If a state chooses not to have a program, the EPA will itself implement
pollution control in that state. Amendments to the CWA in 1987390
provide that the EPA shall treat tribes similarly to the states for most
purposes including implementation of the permit program and the
non-point source control program. Tribes are also defined as "munici-
palities" in the CWA,391 making them eligible for federal grants for
construction of sewage treatment facilities. Each of the other environ-
mental statutes listed above has similar delegation clauses, except for
RCRA.3 9 2
RCRA is the only federal environmental statute that does not
authorize Indian tribes to be treated as states for implementation of
388. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)-(b) (1988).
389. I § 1342(b).
390. Title V, § 506, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 77 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1377(h)).
391. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(4) (1988).
392. The CAA provides that the redesignation or change of air quality standards on an
Indian reservation can be done by the tribal, not the state government. If either a state or a tribe
permits a new emission source that contributes to air pollution greater than that permitted by the
receiving government's area, either may request the EPA to arbitrate the dispute. If it cannot be
arbitrated, then the EPA has authority to decide the issue. 42 U.S.C. § 7474 (1988).
The SDWA protects drinking water supplies, including sources and distribution systems, from
contamination. Amendments in 1986 authorized the EPA administrator to treat Indian tribes
the same as states and delegate implementation power to them for most purposes. Alternatively,
if a tribe does not seek or obtain EPA approval, this federal agency is empowered to implement
the program itself. 42 U.S.C. § 300(h)-i(e) (1988).
CERCLA (the "Superfund" Act) is designed to facilitate cleanup of hazardous waste sites and
oil spills. In 1986, SARA authorized tribes, as well as states and the United States, to recover for
losses to natural resources from hazardous waste disposal or oil spills. Tribes also are authorized
to enter into cooperative agreements with states to join in an effort to clean up hazardous waste
sites. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d)(1).
FIFRA regulates pesticide handling and use. In its original enactment in 1978 Congress
empowered the EPA Administrator to delegate almost complete operating authority to Indian
tribes as well as states. 7 U.S.C. § 136u (1988).
The SMCRA recognizes that surface coal mining creates serious environmental problems and
that regulation is necessary to require operators to reclaim the land after mining is completed.
From its initial enactment this law has mandated that tribes be treated as states for most
purposes under the Act. 30 U.S.C. § 1235(k).
Tribes will be granted primacy under the CWA, CERCLA, and the SDWA only if they meet
certain conditions concerning governmental powers and the capacity to implement these federal
statutes. They also need federal funding, which has been totally inadequate to date.
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the Act, which regulates disposal of solid and hazardous wastes to
protect underground water sources. RCRA is intended to track haz-
ardous wastes from their origin to their final disposition. As with the
CWA, tribes are defined as "municipalities," and thus are eligible for
financial assistance for facilities planning, legal assistance, economic
and other studies.3 93
In a recent case, the state of Washington attempted to exercise
RCRA jurisdiction over reservations.3 94  The EPA, however,
approved the state program only as to non-Indian lands on reserva-
tions. The Court held that Indian tribes possess inherent sovereignty,
which the EPA recognizes, and Indian reservations are not subject to
state regulation under the Act. The EPA may approve tribal jurisdic-
tion, or if a tribe declines implementation, then the EPA may regulate
in the tribe's place.395
These delegations of environmental authority to Indian tribes illus-
trate how Indian tribal governments are entrenched in the statutory
and case law of the nation. Their existence denies the "disappearing
Indian" myth, and illustrates how Indian governments and institu-
tions have become a permanent part of the governmental structure of
the nation.
2. The Power To Exclude
Indian tribes generally have the power to exclude persons from the
reservation.3 9 6 This power sometimes is provided for in treaties, but it
exists as an inherent sovereign power whether or not found in a treaty,
statute, or other government source.3 97 Tribes clearly have the power
to exclude non-members from trust lands.398 Whether the tribe can
exclude a non-member from fee patent land depends on the circum-
stances. Certainly the tribe could not exclude a person from his or her
own land on the reservation, or from road access to that land.
Whether a tribe could exclude a non-member from all non-Indian
owned land on the reservation has not been answered by the courts.
393. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(13) (1988).
394. Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
395. Id. at 1472.
396. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
397. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 252.
398. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Indian
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1982).
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3. Tribal Legislatures and Tribal Courts
All but a few Indian tribes have legislative bodies,399 much like a
typical city council. These legislatures enact laws which are then
enforced by the executive branch of government,' and by tribal
police. Tribal legislative bodies exist whether or not the tribe has a
constitution approved by the Secretary of the Interior under the 1934
Indian Reorganization Act.4 °"
In the past twenty years, tribal councils have become increasingly
active in passing legislation. In earlier times the principal law adopted
by most tribes was a criminal code dealing with misdemeanors." 2
This has changed. In recent years tribal councils have enacted laws
concerning inheritance, domestic relations, traffic control, adoption,
taxation, and a multitude of other topics.403  These enactments
demonstrate the intention of tribal governments to exercise their pow-
ers of self-government and to control their own destinies.
Approximately 130 tribal courts operate on reservations in the
United States.' Most tribal courts are courts of general jurisdiction
that derive their authority from the inherent sovereignty of the tribe,
as reflected in the tribal constitution and ordinance. Under their
inherent sovereign powers tribal courts start with unlimited criminal
and civil jurisdiction. Limitations, however, have been placed on tri-
bal court jurisdiction by Congress, the Supreme Court, and in some
instances by tribal laws. Federal law limits tribal court criminal juris-
diction to punishments of no more than one year in jail and $5000.11
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribel 6 restricts tribal court jurisdic-
tion to Indians, and Duro v. Reina 4°7 limits that jurisdiction to mem-
399. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 247.
400. In some tribes implementation is not by a separate executive branch. Instead, staff
works under direct control of the council. See INDIAN TRIBAL CODES (R. Johnson ed. 1988).
401. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 247.
402. Id at 250.
403. INDIAN TRIBAL CODES (R. Johnson ed. 1988).
404. About 17 BIA courts, or Courts of Indian Offenses, also operate in the United States.
These courts are regulated by 25 C.F.R. pt. 11 (1990). They draw their authority as well as their
pay from the BIA and are considered arms of the federal government; judges are hired and fired
by the BIA. Tribal courts draw their authority from "sovereignty" and are independent of the
federal government F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 250.
Since 1970, the National American Indian Court Judges Association has conducted extensive
training programs for tribal judges, many of whom are now lawyers.
405. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1988).
406. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
407. 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2064-65 (1990). But see Department of Defense Appropriations Act,




bers of the tribe where the court sits. In other words, tribal courts
have no criminal jurisdiction over either non-Indians or non-member
Indians. On the civil side, tribal courts' general jurisdiction is not lim-
ited by federal law in extent or type of case. Where P.L. 280
applies,4 8 some tribes exercise concurrent civil jurisdiction with state
courts.
Tribal courts were not historically part of Indian dispute resolution.
In 1883, the BIA began creating a system of Courts of Indian Offenses,
similar to the Indian courts now operating under the Code of Federal
Regulations.' Few tribal courts existed at the time. Enactment of
the IRA in 1934 encouraged rapid growth of tribal courts based on
inherent sovereignty. The trend dwindled during the termination era,
but developed rapidly again after the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968.410 Most tribal courts are not significantly different from state
courts, although they occasionally apply customary tribal law. The
Bill of Rights of the federal Constitution does not constrain tribal gov-
ernments,4 1 but they are bound by the legislated Indian Civil Rights
Act, which is very similar to the federal Bill of Rights.412 Tribal
courts have civil jurisdiction similar to state courts over matters occur-
ring on the reservation. To the extent that the tribe has legislative
jurisdiction over environmental matters on the reservation, the tribal
court has civil enforcement powers against non-Indians, and both civil
and criminal enforcement power as to tribal members. The tribal
court also has jurisdiction over suits for nuisance, negligence, or ripa-
rian rights, depending on the applicable statutory and common law as
determined by each tribe.
B. Canada
As Canada evolved from colonial status to independence, the Indig-
enous people were largely ignored, except where the government nego-
tiated agreements to obtain more land for settlement.413 The
Aboriginals played no part in negotiating the Confederation or in
drafting the British North America Act of 1867, which assigned legis-
408. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1988), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1988), and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)); see supra notes 102-03
and accompanying text.
409. 25 C.F.R. pt. 11 (1990); see F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 736-37.
410. 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
411. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 664-66; see United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978);
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1886).
412. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 666-70; see Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978).
413. INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT, supra note 206, at 39.
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lative authority with respect to "Indians and Lands reserved for the
Indians" to the federal government.414 The government assumed
increasing legislative control over Indian communities, leading to the
1876 Indian Act, which, with minor modifications, remains in effect
today.415 The result over the years has been the wholesale erosion of
First Nation governmental powers.41 6
Initially, the federal government recognized traditional native gov-
ernments for the purpose of signing treaties and surrendering land. In
spite of the fact that a Legislative Assembly study of 1858 recom-
mended that traditional First Nation internal government be
allowed, 1 7 the government nonetheless soon imposed controls on tri-
bal governments. Subsequent detailed legislation deprived the tribes
of most of their self-governing powers.418
In 1869, Parliament passed the Act for the Gradual Enfranchise-
ment of Indians and the Better Management of Indian Affairs.419 The
provisions of this Act have been only slightly altered since that time.
Section 10 of the Act provided for elections for office to be held for a
three year term. The officers were subject to removal by the governor
"for dishonesty, intemperance or immorality.""42 Especially in small
communities, this "elective method" appears to have been less demo-
cratic than existing Indian customs and tradition. The three year term
and the limited powers of removal vested in the Governor denied the
immediate control of the Chiefs formerly possessed by the
community.421
Parliament intended to introduce the Indigenous people to the dom-
inant society's forms of government, and inculcate a spirit of individu-
ality in place of the communal life and hereditary leadership of the
traditional past.422 The Indian-elected governments were given only
trivial powers, and generally were subjected to stifling supervision by
government. An 1880 amendment gave the Governor in Council
broad discretion over the bands, to make decisions "[w]henever the
Governor in Council deems it advisable."423 The Indian agent was
414. CAN. REv. STAT. app. II, No. 5, § 91(24) (1985). Neither did Indians play a part such
as this in the United States.
415. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. 1-5 (1985).
416. See generally INDIAN SELF-GovERNMENT, supra note 206.
417. Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, supra note 110, at 593.
418. Id. at 594-603.
419. Ch. 6, 1869 Can. Stat. 22; see J. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 93 n.59.
420. Ch. 6, § 10, 1869 Can. Stat. 22, 24.
421. Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, supra note 110, at 594.
422. Id. at 582-83.
423. Ch. 28, § 72, 1880 Can. Stat. 202, 223.
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empowered to call and reside over all band council meetings. The
Department's blindness to First Nation objections to this intrusion
into tribal powers of self-government is unfortunate. The same ethno-
centrism that has plagued Indian policy in the United States has
plagued Canadian Aboriginal policy.
The band council elective system was fully developed by 1884.424
The First Nations consistently resisted it. In 1951, the Indian Act was
again amended by legislation that returned the form of the Act to its
1868 concepts. The policy of self-determination apparently was never
seriously considered in Canada.425
Many experts assert the First Nations still have sovereign govern-
mental powers, even though seldom used and yet unrecognized by the
federal government.426 Some suggest that it is not the sovereign gov-
ernmental powers of Indigenous people that are ill-defined, but the
recognition of these powers in Canadian law.427 The federal govern-
ment has so occupied the internal affairs of First Nations, however,
that precious little room is left for self-government. Federal regulation
defines bands, amalgamates bands, permits the government to abro-
gate band custom councils, determines how the councils of certain
bands are elected, determines who shall be a member of the band,
determines how a band council may make decisions, determines how a
band may spend its money, and defines the legislative power of a band
council.428
Although many bands claim rights to self-government and to their
own tribal courts429 as an Aboriginal right never divested,430 the
Indian Act historically and today does not recognize such claims.431
The powers of band councils to make by-laws have been virtually
unchanged since 1886 and are confined to matters with which a rural
municipality might normally be concerned. They are, however,
expressly subject to regulations that the Governor in Council might
make consistently with the Indian Act and the power of disallowance
of the Minister of Indian Affairs. The power to make money by-
424. Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, supra note I10, at 596.
425. INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT, supra note 206, at 42.
426. Id. at 43.
427. J. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 82-83; INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT, supra note 206, at
43-45.
428. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 1-5, §§ 2(1), 2(3)(6), 9(1), 10(1), 17(l)(a), 61(1), 74, 74(1), 81, 83,
85.1. (1985); J. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 90-91.
429. Hemmingson, Jurisdiction of Future Tribal Courts in Canada: Learning From the
American Experience, 2 CAN. NATIVE L. REP. 1 (1988).
430. INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT, supra note 206, at 43.
431. Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, supra note 110, at 593.
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laws-the taxation of interests in reserve land and of band members-
is confined to those bands declared to have "reached an advanced
stage of development. ' 432 In the Province of Saskatchewan there are
sixty-seven bands with a population of approximately 45,000-none of
the bands has been declared to have "reached an advanced stage of
development. 4 3
Two kinds of band councils operate i Canada: those selected by
customary means (about 35%) and those elected under terms of sec-
tion 74 of the Indian Act (about 65%).4 3' Band councils selected by
custom exercise customary powers but can be stripped of these powers
by Parliament. Disagreement exists as to the powers of the section 74
councils.43 5 Some courts take the view that their powers derive
strictly from the Indian Act. Others contend they have broader pow-
ers, but no court has taken the position of Worcester v. Georgia436 that
Indian tribes have all powers of government unless specifically
removed by federal statute or by their dependent status.
In 1983, the Report of the Special Committee of the House of Com-
mons on Self-Government recommended that the rights of Indian peo-
ples to self-government be explicitly stated and entrenched in the
Canadian Constitution.437 Indian governments would then form a dis-
tinct order of government. The Committee recommended that, while
waiting the constitutional entrenchment, Parliament should fully
occupy the field, ousting Provincial jurisdiction, and then vacate those
areas of jurisdiction to recognize First Nation governments. Different
agreements would be entered into with each First Nation concerning
the extent of that tribe's jurisdiction, including land and water man-
agement, revenue raising, and economic and commercial develop-
ment.43 A bill was introduced in Parliament based on the Committee
recommendations, 39 but fell far short of implementing the Report's
recommendations and was never passed." 0 Bartlett observes that
"[t]he Bill did not provide for self-government or even self-manage-
ment. It merely provides for the possibility of negotiating with the
432. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 1-6, § 83(1) (1970).
433. Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada, supra note 110, at 600.
434. J. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 164.
435. Id.
436. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556-57 (1832).
437. INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT, supra note 206, at 41, 44, 141.
438. Id at 59, 64, 76.
439. C-52 (1984) ("Indian Self-Government Act") (on file with the Washington Law Review).
440. R. BARTLETr, A HOMELAND, supra note 110, at 160-61.
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minister an agreement which could confer powers of self-management
over Indian lands." 441
"In spite of [intrusive provincial policies], the concept of a home-
land has been gaining strength . . . The idea of a homeland for
Aboriginal peoples seems now to be an accepted part of provincial and
federal government policy for Indians, Inuit and Metis." 2
1. Federal Delegation of Environmental Control to First Nations
No delegation of Canadian national environmental laws to First
Nations has occurred in Canada. One obvious reason is the paucity of
governmental authority held by these Nations. Without some type of
on-going governmental operation it is unlikely that the national gov-
ernment would delegate governing authority to Indian tribes.
2. Tribal Courts
Tribal courts, drawing authority from inherent sovereignty, do not
operate in Canada, although that may change if the movement toward
self-determination, self-government and independence continues to
grow. Alternatively, First Nations may attempt to establish courts on
the basis of existing Indian Act authority. Woodward believes that
"'as government by band by-law becomes more and more common, it
may be expected that bands will attempt to establish their own courts
and tribunals to enforce and interpret those laws."" 3 He concludes,
however, that the Indian Act provides a "thin" basis upon which to
build a judicial system to enforce band by-laws.' 4
VII. CONCLUSION
Although similarities exist between Canadian and United States pol-
icies concerning Native tribes and bands, the differences are substan-
tial. Neither country deserves accolades for dealing fairly with the
Aboriginal tribes within their borders.
The official national policy of both countries has always been to
negotiate voluntary treaties and agreements with Indigenous tribes.
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 first stated this policy. The 1763
Proclamation also pronounced that only the national government
could sign treaties with First Nations, a position later adopted by both
Canada and the United States.
441. Id. at 162.
442. Id. at 178.
443. J. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 378.
444. Id.
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In spite of these official declarations, the real policy of both govern-
ments was to move the Aboriginals off the land and make it available
for prospecting, logging, farming, and settlement by non-Indians. The
policies of treaty negotiation, removal, assimilation, and reservations
were all designed to accomplish this overriding goal. In practice, trea-
ties and other cessions were seldom concluded with willing Indian
tribes. The tribes usually knew that they must either cede their lands
and put their welfare and survival at the mercy of the dominant gov-
ernment, or be pushed aside without even a small reservation to call
home.
The swings in United States policy have been more extreme than in
Canada: from removal in the first half of the nineteenth century, to a
reservation policy for the second half of that century, to assimilation
under the 1887 Allotment Act, to self-determination in 1934, to termi-
nation in the 1960s and back to self-determination in the 1970s and
1980s. Canada has maintained a consistent policy of individualization
and assimilation from 1763 to recent time.
Both nations recognize Aboriginal land rights, and in both only the
national government has legal authority to abrogate such rights. In
the United States virtually no aboriginal rights remain, having been
eradicated largely by Indian cessions in the reservation era of the
1800s. Claims still alive went to the 1946 Indian Claims Commission
where tribes received partial monetary compensation for their lost
land." Except for a few remaining claims, aboriginal land rights are
no longer an issue in the United States. The situation is quite different
in Canada. Although some cessions occurred in treaties and agree-
ments establishing reserves in Canada, these documents were used
more sparingly than in the United States, resulting not so much from
any conscious policy as from the fact that central and western Canada
were settled later than the western United States and had fewer popu-
lation pressures. Canada has only recently attacked this problem and
under national policies promulgated in the 1970s and the Constitution
Act of 1982, is now attempting to negotiate settlement of Aboriginal
claims." 6 Other Canadian First Nation claims are in the courts for
resolution. Nothing comparable to the United States Indian Claims
Commission is anticipated in Canada. The Canadian policy of negoti-
ation poses a long and arduous journey, but has the distinct advantage
of showing respect for tribal claims.
445. It was only partial because values were determined as of the date of the taking, and no
interest was allowed on the years since the taking. U.S. INDIAN CLAIMs COMM'N, FINAL
REPORT 11 (1978).
446. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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The United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament both have
extremely broad powers to legislate about Indian affairs, under the
United States Constitution and the several Constitution Acts of Can-
ada. Until recently these governments could abrogate treaties, dises-
tablish reservations in whole or part, take Indian property in
condemnation proceedings, determine who is an Indian, and deter-
mine the nature of tribal government. Canadian law has changed with
Sparrow v. The Queen.4 7
In 1903, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock" 8 that Congress should act "with perfect good faith"
towards Indians, but held that Congress, not the Court, was the arbi-
ter of its own good faith." 9 In contrast, the Canadian Supreme Court
ruled in Sparrow that the courts will give careful scrutiny to legislation
adversely impacting Native Americans.450
This ruling is reminiscent of two separate doctrines in the United
States. With regard to off-reservation treaty fishing rights in the
Pacific Northwest, the courts have held that states can regulate these
rights, but only when necessary for conservation, and only when regu-
lation of non-Indian fishermen cannot accomplish the same pur-
pose.451 The states, in other words, must regulate the non-Indians
first, before regulating the treaty tribes.
The second parallel with Sparrow concerns the constitutional rights
of "equal protection" set forth in the fifth and fourteenth amendments
to the federal Constitution. Under the cases interpreting these consti-
tutional rights, a legislative classification based on a fundamental right
(e.g., voting, travel), or upon race, ethnic origin, or religion, will be
given "strict scrutiny" by the courts. The courts reject any presump-
tion of validity. The legislation will be upheld only if it is necessary to
achieve a "compelling governmental interest." An examination of the
cases reveals that very few statutes that trigger strict scrutiny pass this
test. The Sparrow approach implements the fiduciary relationship,
and ought to be considered carefully by courts in the United States.
The question is whether the legislation about Indians is consistent with
the government's fiduciary responsibility, whether it advances Indian
interests or does them harm. Such a test is needed because of the often
cavalier and sometimes disastrous ways that Native American tribes
447. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
448. 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
449. Id. at 567-68.
450. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 1109-10.
451. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 333, 342 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
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and their governments are treated by congressional and state legisla-
tion. Such a test would be particularly relevant where Congress enacts
legislation adversely impacting tribal self-government. Such legisla-
tion can totally destroy the all important rights to self-government,
can even destroy the tribe as a political entity, without the payment of
compensation-because no "property" is taken.
Sparrow also implies that compensation will be required if the gov-
ernment takes any Indian aboriginal right. In the United States, no
compensation is required when the federal government takes aborigi-
nal lands or rights.452
In the United States, the 1832 decision of Worcester v. Georgia ruled
that state laws do not apply on Indian reservations.4"3 But that bright-
line doctrine has been chipped away to the point that today state laws
often apply on reservations, for example, where a crime or civil wrong
is committed by one non-Indian against another non-Indian, where
states have asserted jurisdiction under P.L. 280, and where county
zoning applies to predominantly non-Indian owned areas of reserva-
tions. Nonetheless, Indian tribes in the United States still retain many
characteristics of sovereign government. Tribes enact their own civil
and criminal laws, establish and empower their own tribal courts,
exercise criminal jurisdiction over their members, determine criteria
for tribal membership, control inheritance rights, and retain civil juris-
diction over non-Indians where a vital tribal interest such as health or
safety is involved-and they do all of these things with about the same
degree of success as state and local governments. In Canada, a combi-
nation of federal and provincial law smothers tribal governments. Vir-
tually no self-governing powers exist.
The Canadian attitude toward Indian self-government is anomalous
in that the government acknowledged the legitimacy of tribal govern-
ment for the purpose of signing treaties and ceding land, but has since
refused to acknowledge that Indians are capable of self-government.
If anything, the Canadian government's policy towards Indian self-
government has been more denigrating and stifling than policies of the
United States. In the past thirty years self-determination and eco-
nomic self-sufficiency have become the official national United States
policy towards tribes. Nearly all Indian tribes in the United States
have self-created governments, constitutions, tribal courts, tribal
police, and other accoutrements of government. In a sense these gov-
ernments have become "constitutionalized," and are now accepted as
452. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
453. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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a permanent part of the legal landscape of the United States. In Can-
ada, the movement toward self-determination and self-government is
at a very different stage. Almost no self-government exists, even
though many Indian tribes and academic scholars believe that self-
governing powers based on inherent sovereignty could be exercised by
the tribes. The recent Report of the Special Committee of the House
of Commons, "Indian Self-Government in Canada," makes a strong
case for creating, or recognizing, the independence, self-governing
powers, and right to self-determination of Canadian Indian tribes. But
Indian self-government is not a widely accepted concept in Canada, as
it is in the United States. The prevailing law in Canada for reserva-
tions emanates from a federal or provincial source rather than from
tribal legislative bodies as in the United States.
In the United States, termination was the official Indian policy in
the 1950s. More than 100 tribes were terminated under this policy,
and P.L. 280 was enacted authorizing states to impose jurisdiction
over Indian reservations either with or without tribal consent. In Can-
ada, the idea of a termination policy did not officially appear until a
1969 government White Paper. This document was met with such
strong opposition that the policy was dropped and never effectuated.
The impact of termination in the United States was especially great in
its destruction of tribal governments.454 Canadian termination policy
would have had its greatest impact in destroying Aboriginal claims,
because no tribal governments exist. In both countries, special health
and welfare programs would have terminated.
In both Canada and the United States, the role of academics has
been significant in forming contemporary government policy and law.
Academic legal literature dealing with Indians was virtually nonexis-
tent in both countries until the 1970s. In the 1980s, however, the
trickle of the late 1970s became a flood. This literature has informed
the courts of important theories, historical and anthropological data,
analytical approaches, and policy considerations. It is noteworthy
that the great bulk of academic legal literature on both sides of the
border tends to take a pro-Indian point of view.
Canada deals with Indian tribes through the comprehensive Indian
Act, a single statute that defines and controls nearly all Indian rela-
tions between Indians and the government. In the United States, there
is no single statute comparable to the Indian Act. Statutes dealing
454. But, at the same time, it was undoubtedly a major factor in the development of pan-
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with Indians and Indian tribes are scattered, and frequently
uncoordinated.
In the United States, tribal courts are now woven into the legal
fabric of the nation. They provide law and order and dispute resolu-
tion for the reservations. Their successful operation, especially since
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, is viewed with justifiable pride by
the Indian community. With their unlimited civil jurisdiction, and
significant criminal jurisdiction, they serve a critically important func-
tion on the reservations. The competence of the judges and other
court personnel continues to improve. An increasing number of these
courts are staffed with lawyers. Full faith and credit is usually given
to their judgments by state courts.455 In Canada, no tribal courts
exist. In the past few years Canadian natives have shown great inter-
est in the tribal court system in the United States. Some Canadian
Indians believe there is sufficient residual sovereignty in Canadian
tribes to support a tribal court system, but it is clear that the Indian
Act would have to be overhauled before an effective tribal court sys-
tem could be created in Canada.
The policy of self-determination, combined with economic self-suffi-
ciency, is the most enlightened policy choice ever adopted by the
United States toward American Indians. This policy permits Indians
to determine what is best for themselves, rather than thrusting feder-
ally designed programs at the tribes. Self-determination furthers two
key goals. It fosters a genuinely pluralistic society; and it provides
Indians with legal and political space to define themselves in their own
way. Congress has effected this policy through a variety of legislative
enactments, while the Executive branch has embraced the policy for
the past twenty years.
Until recently, United States Supreme Court decisions supported
and reinforced self-determination. Unfortunately, the contemporary
Court has begun to undercut this policy, through decisions denying
Indian tribal courts jurisdiction over non-member Indians, allowing
state taxes to apply on reservations, refusing to find federal preemption
in key situations, and denying Indians the protection needed for exer-
cising their religious beliefs. It will be unfortunate, indeed, if the
Supreme Court undercuts this policy, which took so long and so many
tragic mistakes to evolve. Historically, the federal courts in the
United States were the guardians of Indian rights, a role that now
appears to be changing.
455. See, eg., Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, 462 N.W.2d 164 (N.D. 1990).
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At the same time, the Canadian Supreme Court is headed in the
opposite direction, toward greater judicial protection of First Nations
and Aboriginal rights. The Sparrow decision enhances the trust
responsibilities of the courts in Canada, giving them substantive
review powers over legislation affecting aboriginal land claims and
self-government. These powers assure consistency between govern-
mental action, the trust relationship, and the honor of the Crown.
In the United States, tribal governments, tribal courts, and tribal
businesses have established themselves as legally valid, politically justi-
fied, and economically sound endeavors. State and local governments
increasingly respect them, engage in joint programs with them, and
cooperate in areas of mutual interest. Congress may now be the pre-
ferred forum in which to press toward institutionalizing these gains,
and assuring that Indian tribal self-determination and self-government
are permanently woven into the fabric of society.
